EU-US INTERNATIONAL SEMINAR ON LTTE
9th -10th Dec 2008
EUROPOL
The Hague

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Introduction
 
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Time to Act:
The LTTE, its Front Organizations, and the Challenge to Europe

 

By Ravinatha P. Aryasinha
Ambassador of Sri Lanka to the EU,
Belgium and Luxembourg

 


2. Origins and trajectory of LTTE terrorism

 

The LTTE’s genesis could be traced to 1974 when Velupillai Prabhakaran formed the Tamil New Tigers (TNT), at a time many other Tamil youth groups also took to arms. However following Indian mediation in 1987 and the agreement of the Indo- Sri Lanka Accord which granted significant powers to the Tamil speaking areas of Sri Lanka, while all other terrorist groups joined the political mainstream, the LTTE stubbornly persisted with its terrorist tactics demanding a separate ‘Tamil Eelam’ a mono-ethnic state for the Tamils in an area which covers over 28.7% of the landmass and 60% of the coastal belt of the country. From 1987-1990 it fought the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) and ever since has engaged the Sri Lankan security forces in armed combat.
 


The aims and objectives of the LTTE.
 

  1. The Strategic Aim of the LTTE is to gain absolute control over the Northern and Eastern Provinces of Sri Lanka, in order to establish a “traditional homeland” exclusively for Tamil people with self-determination and autonomy. They say “the thirst of the Tamil Tigers is Tamil Eelam” (a separate state).

  2. The Political Aim of the LTTE : Politically the LTTE makes every effort to establish a separate administration system in the Northern and Eastern Provinces, which includes the authority to have its own Armed Forces, Police, Judicial, Economic and Political system for the Tamils. This in short is a blue print of a separate state.

  3. The Military Aim of the LTTE : The military strategy of the LTTE is to formulate a standing force comprising land, sea and air forces, in order to act in the interest of the LTTE Leader to achieve its strategic objective, namely the establishment of ‘Tamil Eelam.’


Organizational Chart of the LTTE

The LTTE leadership is organized along a two-tier structure: a military wing and a subordinate political wing. Overseeing both is a central governing committee, headed by the LTTE chief, Velupillai Prabhakaran. This body has the responsibility for directing and controlling following subdivisions; namely, Sea Tiger wing (headed by Soosai), Air wing, (headed by Kennedy), Military wing (headed by Banu and Theepan), a highly secretive intelligence wing (headed by Pottu Amman), and a political office (headed by Nadesan).

The central governing committee also has an International Secretariat (headed by Castro), which is in charge of the outfit's global network and its international propaganda and fund raising operations. These operations are the lifeblood of the LTTE and are mainly coordinated by the LTTE’s front organizations, most prominently the Tamil Rehabilitation Organisation (TRO) and the Tamil Coordinating Committee (TCC).
 


Atrocities committed by the LTTE

The LTTE’s ruthlessness and violence is largely unparalleled by any other terrorist organization and since the inception of its struggle, the LTTE has left behind a trail of atrocities.


Most significantly, The LTTE is the only organization to have assassinated two national leaders in two different countries. In May 1991, the LTTE assassinated Rajiv Gandhi, former Prime Minister of India and in 1993, the LTTE assassinated Ranasinghe Premadasa, the President of Sri Lanka. The LTTE also made an abortive attempt to take the life of President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga in December 1999. Besides the killing of Sinhalese and Muslim politicians, the largest segment of the LTTE’s assassinations have been directed against the Tamil community itself, where nearly two generations of moderate Tamil politicians and academics of Sri Lanka including former Opposition Leader A. Amirthalingam, Tamil intellectual and constitutional expert Dr. Neelan Thiruchelvam, Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar, the Deputy Secretary General of the Government Peace Secretariat Ketheeshwaran Loganathan (who incidentally was a member of the Tamil delegation to the very first round of talks the GOSL had with Tamil militants in Thimpu, Bhutan in 1985), and successive Mayors of Jaffna Ms. Sarojini Yogeswaran and Mr. Pon Sivapalan. Their only fault appears to have been the refusal to yield to the tyranny of the LTTE and abandon the democratic path. Today the Tamil community of Sri Lanka has been left bereft of moderate and democratic leaders due to the methodical process of elimination adopted by the LTTE during the past three decades.

It has also engaged, inter alia, in indiscriminate attacks against civilian populations or individual civilians, among its some 70,000 victims largely innocent women and children. It has conscripted children into its fighting cadre and forced them to engage in armed activities. The last estimate by UNICEF before the current round of fighting was 5,700. In an attempt to establish mono-ethnic regions the LTTE has engaged in ethnic cleansing when in October 1990, with two days notice, the LTTE decided to evict approximately 75,000 Muslim people from Jaffna, and Mannar (these Muslims now numbering about 100,000 are housed in I62 refugee camps in several districts). The same year, 1990, they deployed Chlorine gas weapons in Kiran in the Batticaloa District. In July 2006 by closing the sluice gates of Mavil Aru, the LTTE used water as a weapon of war, an abominable practice outlawed by international humanitarian law. The LTTE had also succeeded in destroying many religious, economic and military infrastructure facilities in the country including the Central Bank in 1996, with far reaching consequences. Its July 2001 attack on Colombo Airport was one of the most destructive acts of terrorism in aviation history- destroying or damaging 26 aircraft, half of the national airline’s commercial planes and a quarter of the air-force fleet.


GOSL’s response to LTTE terrorism

i. Sri Lanka’s legislative responses to LTTE violence and the definition & criminalization of Terrorism

Viewed in the back drop that the international community is yet to arrive at a consensus regarding the definition of ‘terrorism’, and the debate that continues as to when ‘liberation’ (which is lawful) ends and ‘terrorism’ (which should be unlawful) begins, the challenge faced by Sri Lanka’s legislative and criminal justice systems in dealing with the growing phenomenon of LTTE terrorism merits attention. Even as states debate as to whether a ‘State’ could be held liable for perpetrating terrorism, or whether only ‘Non State Actors’ could be held accountable for terrorism, certain terrorist activities such as hostage taking, terrorist funding, terrorist bombings, have been defined in international law and criminalized.
 

  • In line with this approach adopted by the international community and in keeping with the security situation that prevailed in the late 1970s, the Government of Sri Lanka though Parliament defined and criminalized certain specified terrorist activities, without venturing into defining ‘Terrorism’.

  • During the initial stages, legislative measures were incorporated into Regulations promulgated under the Public Security Ordinance (commonly referred to as Emergency Regulations) which were enacted by the President and subsequently ratified by the Parliament. These regulations and the impact created by their promulgation enabled the Security Forces and the Police to deal with the emergency of politically motivated acts of violence unleashed by separatist armed militants, whom Sri Lanka identified right from the beginning as ‘Terrorists’. In the face of the ascendance of the LTTE, in 1978, the Proscription of Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) Act was enacted. It proscribed the LTTE as an organization, and criminalized becoming a member of the LTTE and aiding and abetting it. This law was later repealed to facilitate peace negotiations with the LTTE.

  • In 1979, the Prevention of Terrorism Act was enacted. This law did not define ‘terrorism’. It criminalized a range of terrorist activities such as (a) assassinations and murder, (b) possession, manufacture, importation, transportation, and use of explosives and weapons, (c) causing mischief to government property, etc

Though Sri Lanka continued to face the brunt of brutal terrorism for over 25 years, Sri Lanka had not defined or criminalized terrorism until the end of 2006.
 
  • On 6th December 2006, the President of Sri Lanka acting in terms of the Public Security Ordinance, issued a proclamation proscribing terrorism. This proclamation (published in the government gazette) is referred to as the Emergency (Proscription of Terrorism and Specified Terrorist Activities) Regulations 2006. These regulations contain a definition of terrorism, and make engaging in terrorism an offence punishable with 10 – 20 years imprisonment. Here ‘Terrorism’ is defined as any unlawful conduct which :
  1. Involves the use of violence, force, coercion, intimidation, threats, duress, or

  2. Threatens or endangers national security, or

  3. Intimidates a civilian population or a group thereof, or

  4. Disrupts or threatens public order, the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the life of the community, or

  5. Causing destruction or damage to property, or

  6. Endangering a person’s life, other than that of the person committing the act, or

  7. Creating a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section of the public, or

  8. is designed to interfere with or disrupt an electronic system, and which unlawful conduct is aimed at or is committed with the object of threatening or endangering the territorial integrity or sovereignty of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka or that of any other recognized sovereign nation, or any other political or governmental change, or compelling the government of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka to do or abstain from doing any act, and includes any other unlawful activity which advocates or propagates such unlawful conduct.


This definition was developed having considered the definition of ‘terrorism’ as developed by several other countries. Violation of this prohibition is an offence and carries penal sanction.


ii. Setting up of the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) in Sri Lanka

Consistent with its international obligations in the field of money laundering and terrorist financing, particularly in the context of Security Council Resolution 1373 dealing, inter-alia, with Financing of Terrorism and the International Convention on the Suppression of

Financing of Terrorism and in keeping with the recommendations of the Intergovernmental body, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), with a view to counter measures against Money Laundering (ML) covering the criminal justice system and law enforcement, the financial system, and international co-operation, in 2005/2006 Sri Lanka promulgation three acts. They are; the Convention on the Suppression of terrorist Financing Act No. 25 of 2005, the Prevention of Money Laundering (PMLA) Act No. 5 of 2006 and the Financial Transaction Reporting (FTRA) Act No. 6 of 2006.

The Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) is a key component set up under the FTRA, to deter criminals from using Sri Lanka and its Financial Institutions for money laundering and Terrorist Financing activity and thus mitigating the risk of the country being exposed to volatile economic and financial conditions the FIU is vested with certain powers that include the power to receive reports of “institutions” to instruct enforcement agencies to take appropriate measures based on the information or reports received by the FIU and conduct examinations of “institutions” if need be. The supervisory authorities and auditors of institutions are also required to co-operate with the FIU to effectively combat money laundering and terrorist financing in Sri Lanka. The unit has played an important part in assisting foreign governments in prosecution against activities of the LTTE and its front organizations.


iii. Legislative and judicial remedies are available even to terrorist suspects.

The Constitution of Sri Lanka guarantees freedom from torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (article 11), equal protection of the law ( article 12), prohibition of retroactive penal legislation, due process including freedom from arbitrary arrest, detention and punishment, presumption of innocence and proof beyond reasonable doubt, and fair trial ( article 13). These fundamental rights are justiciable, through a process of fundamental rights applications to the Supreme Court of Sri Lanka (article 126) and the constitution also guarantees the availability of the writ of Hebeas Copus in terms of persons who allege illegal detention in the High Court and the Court of Appeal.


iv. Sri Lanka has actively participated in the UN deliberations on developing counter-terrorism measures both within the region and at the global level.

Since 1997, as Vice Chair of the UN Ad Hoc Committee on Terrorism, Sri Lanka played an important role in the drafting of the Convention on the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings and since 2000, Dr. Rohan Perera, until recently the Legal Advisor of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Sri Lanka, continues to chair this committee and is playing a pivotal role in the ongoing delicate negotiations of a Comprehensive Convention on the Elimination of Terrorism.

Thus it is clear that Sri Lanka has played its role as a responsible member of the international community in helping to deal with this growing global menace. What we ask of the world today, is merely that they too act with similar responsibility in accordance with their proclaimed pledges to curb all acts of terrorism.



Efforts at talks with the LTTE

While seeking to curb the rise of terrorism, successive governments of Sri Lanka have upheld that the present conflict in Sri Lanka must be resolved through political means, and have done so, negotiating with the LTTE in 1985, 19867/87, 1989-90, 1994-95, 2002-2003 and 2006 to no avail. These periods have been used by the LTTE to merely re-arm and re-group and to resume hostilities at a time of their choosing. For instance, the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM), during the period between 22nd February 2002 to 30th April 2007, had ruled that the

Government armed forces had committed 351 violations of the CFA while the LTTE had committed 3,830 violations. The Ceasefire Agreement which in any event was non-operational and defunct since mid July 2006, was terminated by Sri Lanka on the 17th of January 2008.

As President Mahinda Rajapaksa stated at the 63rd session of the UNGA on 24th September 2008 the “Government has always been ready to address the causes of these issues and effectively implement political and constitutional solutions to meet the aspirations and rights of all communities. What the Government would not, and could not do is to let an illegal and armed terrorist group, the LTTE, to hold a fraction of our population, a part of the Tamil community, hostage to such terror in the Northern part of Sri Lanka and deny those people their democratic rights and free elections…’’

Greater engagement among the political parties in Sri Lanka was made possible through the on going All Party Representatives Committee (APRC), which comprises all democratic political parties including non-LTTE Tamil parties, which were willing to work towards a democratic and honourable settlement. The current Government continues its quest to evolve a consensus to finding a lasting solution to the political aspects of the problem, through this body.


Restoration of normalcy in the East

Following the LTTE walking away from the negotiating table in early 2006 unleashing a spate of attacks on military and civilian targets, at the time it cut off water supplies to the Eastern region of Sri Lanka through blocking of ‘Mavil Aru’ in July 2006, the Government of Sri Lanka launched operations to ‘flush out’ the LTTE from the Eastern Province.

Having successfully cleared the LTTE out of the Eastern province by July 2007, as a first step, in line with the interim recommendations of the APRC, the Government has been able to restore normalcy in the Eastern Province, in a clear message that terrorism can be defeated with coordinated political will. Today, the Government has embarked on a programme to bring about sustainable development in the area, in order to revive the socio economic activity in the province. Local government elections were held in March 2008 followed by provincial council elections in May 2008, and civilian administration has been re-established. Thus the Eastern Province of Sri Lanka could serve as a model in post conflict development, that is worthy of emulation in other situations as well.



Clearing the North of the LTTE

Subsequently, a concerted military campaign has been launched by the Government to clear the LTTE out of the areas they currently dominate in parts of the Northern Province. The Government is on the verge of regaining the so-called capital of the LTTE, Killinochchi, and move on to clear the rest of the LTTE dominated areas with utmost caution, in order to avoid any civilian casualties, and conscious that many are being held against their will as human shields by the LTTE and prevented from leaving those areas into government secured areas. In the interim, the Sri Lankan forces have succeeded in opening a land route to the Jaffna peninsula along the Western coast, a feat achieved after 18 years.

The Sri Lanka Government’s expectation is that these operations will end the LTTE’s conventional fighting capability, and open up space for democracy to prevail in the Northern Province as well. President Mahinda Rajapaksa has made clear that the LTTE too is welcome to join in the development effort of the region, provided they lay down their arms, and join the democratic process.

Sri Lanka’s successes should give other democracies hope, that terrorism can be fought and overcome, with the support and assistance of the international community.

 


 
   
   
   
   

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