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No matter which way you look at it, last Friday's Borella blitzkreig by the LTTE fails to make sense in the context of Prabhakaran's declining international support and the recent series of peace initiatives involving the Norwegian government and the Sri Lankan opposition. The typical off-the-cuff analysis is that by continuing such attacks, the LTTE is trying to bolster its bargaining position ahead of possible peace talks with the government. However, there is increasing evidence that this these tactics are creating an even greater backlash against the Tigers in the form of pressure on the government to pursue the military option with greater vigor. Indeed, President Kumaratunga has already indicated the strong likelihood of such an outcome, if the Tigers fail to be forthcoming about talks. This would obviously enable the Tigers to claim that the "Sinhala Nation" is on its chauvinistic warpath again, once again justifying them in their own renewed cycle of bloodshed, and shoring up their currently depressed ability to extract funds from the Tamil diaspora. In other words, far less likely than strengthening their negotiating position, the LTTE's atrocities simply strengthen the intellectual arguments on both sides for continued hostilities and withdrawal from negotiations. The only winners will be the sceptics on both sides, who are already in rehearsal to croon, "We told you so." Unfortunately, Kumaratunga's bold post-re-election assertion that she would be the leader to see the end of this conflict, and her Independence Day suggestion to the LTTE that assassinating southern politicians was not the way forward appear to have been greeted with typical Tiger contempt. With Friday's abortive Tiger attempt on government ministers, Prabhakaran has snapped his fingers at both government's hopes for a negotiated settlement and its prayers for an end to high-level assassinations.It all appears to confirm the worst fears of various sections of the government: that despite Kumaratunga's working to accommodate the LTTE in her efforts to solve the ethnic conflict, the LTTE simply doesn't want the devolution that she is aiming to offer, since it falls too far short of Eelam. The shame of all this is that neither side has even the faintest glimmering of a comprehensive military victory in sight. All too readily, Prabhakaran's congenital unilateralism seems again likely to condemn the country to a few more years of violence, violence, and more violence, all for the sake of an Eelam that can never be had. It must be remembered that if Prabhakaran is indeed committed to Eelam, then he could not be insisting on a more unrealistic goal. The rest of the country would not allow it, and no southern politician would be foolish enough to consider it. Which is why Prabhakaran's best bet for a viable future lies in a negotiated settlement, particularly when facilitated by Norway, a country with which he has tolerably good relations. President Kumaratunga has made the appeal, "... we have had the largesse of mind and heart to invite even the UNP and the LTTE, who I am convinced had a part in my assassination attempt, to come to the negotiating table with me.... because I put the country before myself." As enticing as her invitation might sound, the LTTE has a well-known record of taking one step towards peace, then suddenly taking two steps back towards war. They did it with J.R. Jayawardane (with the Indo-Lanka Accord), Ranasinghe Premadasa (after the Hilton talks) and with President Kumaratunga (after the 1994 post-election talks). They have done it before, and most observers expect them to do it again. Clearly, it is Prabhakaran, and Prabhakaran only, who can make the decisive move towards peace. However, the reasons why the LTTE attack even during their peace moves remain a mystery - unless, of course, the reasons lie in nothing but a monstrous LTTE egotism which gains a perverse satisfaction from leading local and foreign governments up the garden path. Despite the clear lack of an understandable upside, the LTTE does want to somehow scuttle the peace process. Last Friday's attack proved this motive and the pressure is building on the government to deviate from its peace efforts and go for the military option. Their demand for a troop withdrawal before peace talks is another indication of their rigid end to postpone whatever the negotiations even with any foreign facilitation. President Kumaratunga on the other hand has come further towards peace with the LTTE than other leader. With extreme patience, she has tolerated an LTTE attempt on her life, and still agreeing to talks, even urging Norway, who were displeased with Tiger's covert tactics, to proceed the peace talks. But the LTTE has done it again, kicking away the chance to voice their genuine case for the Tamil minorities. Meanwhile, the pressure on the government is building to revert to the military option and wipe out the LTTE vehemently before the Tigers use more civilians as pawns, blindly for a very distant and unachievable cause.
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