|
|
 |
 |
|||
|
Indian Congress Member of Parliament Main Shanker Aiyar in an article titled 'Relevance of Devolution', published in the 'Indian Express' of May 16, stated that there would be those, in India as in Eelam, seeking the disintegration of India in the cause of a single Tamil nation and that they would be assisted by the most ruthless terrorist organisation our subcontinent has known. There are only two solutions to the ethnic problem in Sri Lanka - partition or devolution. Partition would mean a two-nation theory for the island: that the Sinhalese and the Tamils constitute two separate nations, incompatible, irreconcilable and, therefore, to be separated. Like Pakistan and India. Devolution would mean the recognition that while Tamils and Sinhalese can share a common nationality, such a nation has to be based on the fundamental principle of unity in diversity. The constitutional expression given in India to the principle of unity in diversity is our Union of States. In Sri Lanka, it has to be a Union of Regions. This elementary truth, alas, has escaped all the rulers of Sri Lanka except one - the present President, Chandrika Kumaratunga. Ever since she became President, she has been pressing for constitutional reforms which would give the Tamils the identity, autonomy and self-rule and enable them to run their own affairs while securing to them their civic and political rights, and, most important, their human rights, as equal and honoured citizens of the island, free to lead a life of dignity and safety. Her intention was to work out these constitutional reforms in consultation with LTTE and other Tamil groups. The LTTE initially indicated some willingness to come to the negotiating table but then quickly reneged. She, therefore, went ahead with fashioning a constitutional package on her own. This was ready three years ago. She did not, however, have the required two-thirds majority in parliament to carry through these reforms on the strength of her party alone. She needed the cooperation of her main political opponent, the UNP led by Ranil Wickremesinghe. That cooperation has been as consistently denied her by the UNP as by the LTTE. She, therefore, went to the polls prematurely in the hope of securing a mandate from her people to push through the reforms on her own. She won the elections, but not the majority required to amend the constitution. Thus she stands thwarted in her bid to do the right thing. The Sri Lanka military in Jaffna is now under siege. The war, however, is far from over. The Jaffna town is not the Jaffna peninsula. And Jaffna is not separated from the rest of Sri Lanka by thousands of miles, as East Pakistan was from West Pakistan. To expect the Sri Lankan armed forces to pack up as Gen. Niazi did in 1971 is to live on illusions. Even if Jaffna falls to the LTTE, the war will go on. This is not only because the Sri Lankan army will make every effort to retake the peninsula but also because the LTTE's military objectives do not end with northern Sri Lanka. There is the east still to conquer. For Eelam is conceived as all the northern and eastern half of the island extending from the Palk Strait to the Indian Ocean through Trincomalee, Ampara, Batticaloa and further south. The LTTE has never had in the east the military or political clout it has had in the northern peninsula. Moreover, Trincomalee has a substantial Sinhala population, Ampara a clear Muslim majority and much of the rest of the east a more mixed population than the peninsula in the far north. The LTTE will, therefore, have to follow up any military victory it might secure in the north with a thrust down the eastern salient. That will mean civil war. If the Vajpayee government continues the hands-off policy of the Gowda-Gujral governments, Sri Lanka will be left with no alternative but to save itself by turning to whoever well help. There will be no end of suitors. That is when we will realise that our future is inextricably tied up with Sri Lanka's and that the unity and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka is as much in Indian interest as in Sri Lanka's. If Sri Lanka now recognises that devolution is the stark alternative to partition, the credit for that goes entirely to the 1987 Rajiv Gandhi-Junius Jayawardene accord. Till then, the standard Sri Lankan argument was that Sri Lanka was too small a country for anything other than a unitary constitution. All attempts from the holocaust of 1983 on to persuade Sri Lanka to see the need for devolution as the only viable solution to the Sinhala-Tamil ethnic problem faced until the Sinhala rebellion in the south of the island concentrated Jayawardene's mind wonderfully. Desperate to pull his troops out of the north and east to fight the revolution in the south, he agreed to undertake the overhaul of the Sri Lankan constitution that would secure to the Tamils, their fundamental rights. The bargain was a process of constitutional devolution in exchange for the right to call on India for help. Recognising that the process of devolution would be complicated, convoluted and, therefore, long-drawn out, there was advantage in accepting Jayewardene's request for interposing a peace-keeping force between the Sinhala army and the Tamil population to protect the Tamils, while the slow and tortuous processes of devolution were set in train. It is nonsense to say that the IPKF was sent to Sri Lanka to assist the Sri Lankan army against the LTTE. It was not sent to fight anyone, it was a peace-keeping force. When one element of those it was sent to protect - the LTTE - turned on the peace-keeping forces, we could have cut and run. That would have ended the devolution option and forced on everyone - India included - all the dangers and horrors of partition. The IPKF's presence forced through the 13th Amendment and the elections which gave the Tamils control over the North-East Provincial Council. If the island is still plunged in ruinous strife, it is because the IPKF was stupidly pulled out before devolution was completed. Fortunately, in contrast to the obtuseness and communalism of the earlier rulers of the island, we now have in office the best friend that India - and the Tamils of Sri Lanka - have ever had n Colombo. Chandrika Kumaratunga has not sought India's military intervention - for there is plenty of fight left in her and her armed forces. But she and her people - Sinhala, Tamil and Muslim and others - need to know that India appreciate the sincerity with which the President of Sri Lanka is bent on implementing the 1987 Accord - and even going beyond it. She does not need our armed forces. What she seeks is our solidarity.
|
|
Contact Information: Send
mail to