|
|
|
 |
 |
|||
“The structure of the state is the most fundamental question in all this and some day we have to get that straight – we have to get that right and now. How long are you going to keep delaying it? The argument is this, is it satisfactory just to allow things to slide on? The major questions such as the structure of the state and the merger question and the political rights question and democracy and parliamentary elections and human rights and all those things…are you going to allow those to slide away for a couple of years while you’re addressing only economic, rehabilitation and reconstruction issues? What I’m saying is I don’t think one should be a substitute for the other.” Presidential Adviser Lakshman Kadirgamar was speaking to Eric Fernando of the PRIU in an exclusive interview about the peace process and the issues that need to be tackled.
Exclusive Interview with Presidential Adviser Lakshman Kadirgamar Q: If one were to evaluate the outcome of the first round of talks in Thailand and the press conference which followed, it appears the LTTE has toned downed its call for a separate state. Mr Anton Balasingham spoke for the first time of the concept of substantial autonomy and self-determination and said they operate on the current UN literature on self-determination. What are your views? LK: I don’t see this as a categorical dropping of the separate state. Balasingham’s statements are hedged with qualifications, I think what he is trying to say is this; ‘we will try our best to work towards a solution possible within the frame work of one country, but if the aspirations of the Tamil people are not met then I am afraid we will have to fight for a separate state or nation,’ so there is a balance there… they are giving up the demand for a separate state….. It is there... it is not a total and complete renunciation of a separate state. Now the big question in my mind is how you interpret this regional autonomy and self-determination. For instance, in the context of Balasingham’s own statement, that there is a massive permanent administration on the ground, for which he wants legality, for which he wants legitimacy. Q: Conversely it is now illegal, illegitimate would you say? LK: Yes, they haven’t got the acknowledgement they desire. It is just there, de-facto. Significantly and correctly he mentioned the fact that there are two standing armies, and two standing navies. If you put together all these proponents in an equation… that is, regional autonomy plus self-determination plus permanent administration…de-facto plus standing armies and standing navies…where are you getting? Those are all the components of a separate state. Now what I say is, at this point of time, we need clarifications. We are still in the realm of words – semantics; concepts are not yet clearly defined. Now when he says for instance, ‘we don’t operate on the concept of a separate state, we operate on different concepts, such as homeland…’ and he talks of the UN literature on the question of self-determination, I would say, the post first round needs…clarifications. Q: The autonomous region they’re asking for, has to be constitutionalised? Yesterday at a press conference, you said that you would like to see this wrapped up in one year…is that time frame sufficient? LK: My point is that these are not new questions; these have been around for a long time – lets not fool ourselves, there have been hundreds of books and seminars about these various possibilities, various scenarios – various models, various types of constitutions and all that over the last ten years. And the international lecture circuits and conference circuits are full of discussions of this kind. So its not a question of either party springing something… some new thought on the other, this is all old hat and I don’t see why the parties can’t now come up with their proposals as to how much one is prepared to give and how much the other is prepared to take and so on, now delaying that process has other implications. My feeling is that perhaps neither party wants to get to grips with these issues. They would prefer a state of affairs where you just carry on, in a no war situation, and a no war situation, as we all know is certainly not equivalent to peace. Q: You think then….that party politics is continuing to play a major role here? LK: There are political aspects to it, I think the government itself is in no particular hurry to head on…there would be tough questions and they would require tough choices to be made. These are all choices with very serious political implications for the future destiny of the country. We are at the point where whatever is decided now is going to be for all time. So I don’t think the government is in a hurry to face up to these things, it would prefer a no war situation and a continuation of the kind of euphoria that exists now… you know… that peace has actually come... this is peace… For the LTTE also it has a certain attraction, because they carry on cementing this permanent administration that they talk about – more deeply and entrenching it….and then you find the reality on the ground… that is going to carry with it various legal implications. If you address the questions quickly… adjustments may have to be made now. Q: Could you explain the political implications you refer to? LK: Yes, because after all these are very serious political questions and the structure of the state is the most fundamental question in all this and some day we have to get that straight – we have to get that right and now. How long are you going to keep delaying it? The argument is this, is it satisfactory just to allow things to slide on? The major questions such as the structure of the state and the merger question and the political rights question and democracy and parliamentary elections and human rights and all those things…are you going to allow those to slide away for a couple of years while you’re addressing only economic, rehabilitation and reconstruction issues? What I’m saying is I don’t think one should be a substitute for the other. Q: The current peace process is closely linked to rehabilitation and economic reform as opposed to the earlier attempts, and the no war situation has certainly put an end to the killings. How do you respond to that? LK: My question is why can’t you have a no-war situation on the one hand and the economic rebuilding and so on going along with it, and at the same time simultaneously why don’t you wrap up the solution…the ultimate solution, what’s the problem? I don’t see the problem! Q: Are those your personal views, or are you speaking for the main opposition party – the PA? LK: Yes, I would say so – it is the feeling of the mainstream – the mainstream PA thinking. That is to say, we are fully in favour of an ultimate solution being found by peaceful means, by negotiation. That was one hundred percent the platform of President Kumaratunga from 1994 onwards or even before, yes there were ups and downs. But there has been no wavering from that path, right up to August 2000 when the new constitution was presented, that was the acme – that was the high water mark of the process that she had launched. That was the mark of seriousness, which no other political leader in this country has ever attempted for 50 years – to put down in a sovereign Parliament a document setting out proposals for the devolution of power and the ultimate settlement of the question, including regional autonomy. Q: Is it correct, the Prime Minister had indicated to the President or perhaps even to you that, the document you referred to is good enough to use when it comes to constitutionalizing the autonomy sought by the LTTE? LK: Yes, yes, certainly he did that at our very first meeting in December last year. He told the President his negotiating platform will be the proposed constitution of 2000. When you look at it objectively, you see a reason for it, because into that draft constitution went a very large degree of consensus. Not only the 77 sittings of the select committee…the all party sittings… but very intensive consultations in the year 2000 itself – from March to the end of July between the major parties. At which the President presided and the Prime Minister as the leader of the opposition was present. Discussions continued up to the very last few days before the presentation of the document on the 3rd of August 2000. Q: So how come it was thrown out by Parliament? Would you say it was for political expediency? LK: So it would seem - if you want to speculate on reasons. But nobody can say truthfully today that there was not a very substantial degree of consensus on the fundamental question including the most fundamental of all, the structure of the state – people must be reminded of that today. On the structure of the state, the formula was put forward by Mr. Choksy on behalf of the UNP which was accepted by the President and the PA…that is going very far indeed! And when you consider the treatment that the President received, and the document received in Parliament on the 3rd of August 2000 it is absolutely scandalous – it is inexplicable on any rational basis. One can only explain it on the footing that it was really a very very mala fide attempt to prevent a two-thirds majority… which was within a whisker of being allowed on that particular day. The conclusion would seem to be to be that it must have been a political move – what else could it be? It was not a rational move…it was not born out of a lack of understanding or a lack of consultation – it was not a document that was sprung on anybody, it can’t be that. It was not a question of the opposition saying, ‘Hey what’s all this we have never seen this!’ Q: Well… it could’ve been that the backbenchers either didn’t see it or were not erudite enough to understand such a document. LK: Well the leadership took a decision. Q: If I were to deviate slightly… I recall in the late 90’s the PA devised a package for economic development of the North and East. You presented it to the diplomatic community here in Sri Lanka. Can you tell me more about that? And what was its outcome? LK: Yes, there was a huge document to this effect, and my recollection is, it came to about a billion dollars, it dealt with various components such as construction and aid and so on, and there was a formal presentation of the document by the President herself to the diplomatic community of that time and the general response was very good. Q: Coming back to the current peace process, Mr. Anton Balasingham, not at the main press conference, but in a subsequent interview to mediamen expressed his concern about the lack of cohabitation in the South. He was appealing to the Southerners and said, “You must strengthen the hand of your government.” How do you view this? LK: The LTTE has always been saying this and most markedly in the Killinochchi press conference in the Vanni in April, where very very directly and somewhat rudely, Balasingham talked of Ranil Wickremasinghe being weak and not being able to deliver because of the state of southern politics and therefore, why doesn’t he concentrate on the South and leave the North and East to ‘my leader who is the President and Prime Minister of our part of the world. We don’t really expect you to deliver because your house is not in order’. That was the gist of what he was trying to say. So the message there was delivered quite early in the game. Q: Mr. Kadirgamar, you come through quite clearly… and articulate very well your views on the process, but some of your colleagues in the PA are rather vociferous; often it is a Babel of voices from that region. LK: Yes, there are these voices that you hear from time to time with various different views. My answer is… this is mainstream PA political thinking. Q: How would you define that mainstream? LK: You define the mainstream in terms of one’s own feeling and assessment, by that I don’t mean mine only, I mean the President’s and some other people’s as well, of how the PA views this whole question of the peace process. What its attitude is to the peace process, which we started. What we say to ourselves is – was not the PA virtually one hundred percent behind the 1994 peace process? I say virtually because at that time also, there were dissident but muted voices…. within. There were people who when President Kumaratunga came to power in 1994 were quite astonished at the turn of events. These were people…old stagers…who were in the party for a long time, born and bred politically in the tradition of basically the SLFP… which was a Sinhala, possibly chauvinist, certainly a Sinhala Buddhist party. Now what Mrs. Kumaratunga did was, virtually to break that mindset, that mould, that mental mould, and that she did this almost single-handedly. And what the older hands who were watching during this period, particularly ’92, ’93, ’94 in the run-up to the Parliamentary elections saw was, this visible transformation which was going on in front of their eyes, not something that they necessarily approved of. But it gathered momentum… this transforming process, as a result of the barnstorming and President Kumaratunga criss-crossing the country and holding pocket meetings etc…. these old hands were watching this in disbelief, not knowing whether to participate fully or to stand aside, perhaps thinking it may not reach fruition…they were hesitant. These old stagers were watching to see if she would destroy the party. After she won it was absolutely clear that the SLFP vote-base had not only been maintained, had not been split or eroded, but that this line she was taking had enormously strengthened the party. The old stagers over the next few months and years realised, ‘who are we to say ‘Nay’ to what she’s doing, because after all she has the best of all possible credentials.’ She is the daughter of the founder, and the daughter of the one who preserved the party. So in terms of pedigree and lineage and credentials…she was impeccable. So if she is the one who has succeeded in bringing the SLFP back into power on this very very strange doctrine, which was not the fundamental theory as far as the SLFP was concerned up to that point of time, who are we to say ‘No’? ‘We have been bypassed,’ many of them told me that. Q: But Mr. Kadirgamar, what then went wrong with the PA’s peace efforts? One could argue that the present government has come this far and put an end to the killing because they chose to accept the LTTE’s unilateral ceasefire. LK: That is because they have something that we did not have…that is the post 9/11 phenomenon. In our situation when President Kumaratunga came to power in 1994, she immediately started the peace process. And the peace talks went on for 4 or 5 sessions and there was a ceasefire on the ground. We had even gone to the extent of bringing monitors here. They came, Canadians, Norwegians and Dutch, but they were not allowed to operate by Prabhakaran. So they spent their time at the Galadari Hotel for a month or two and went away. Now it was very clear as those talks went on, that all that the LTTE was interested in was gaining as much as possible, in terms of various economic and other benefits… which is perfectly alright, but without any serious thought about an ultimate solution to the problem. This is the important thing. Balasingham now says that they were very disappointed and even insulted at the quality of the team that was sent to meet with them. Now I can’t accept this as serious because if they were serious, they would have realised that it was very much a preliminary stage where we were trying to get a thaw in the situation. And everything they asked for at that time, they got. So whether the delegation was high powered or not in the ministerial sense, it was not wanting in the sense of being able to deliver what they wanted. They got all the embargoed items reduced from over a hundred to seven by April 14th of 1995. They had the fishing rights restored, they tried to have the Pooneryn camp moved, but there were no takers for that. They wanted armed cadres to be able to move around in the East, there were no takers for that. But on the economic side, enormous strides were made in just a bare 4 or 5 months but when it came to the President asking them, ‘Come, let us now talk business, let us talk substantive issues, and I have preliminary framework we can discuss’ - because work had already begun on a skeletal form of a new constitution. Immediately we saw Prabhakaran’s reaction in the correspondence. He said, ‘No, no the time is not right, we must have more normalcy’ and so on. Don’t forget in that time they were in occupation of the peninsula - they were sitting pretty. And then came April 1995…was there any need to go back to war so suddenly – when you had a process going on? They thought ‘people are getting interested in this subject, that’s very dangerous…and we thought this lady is brand new to politics virtually…and seems a person with a very good track record, nothing racist in her track record, and we can get a lot out of her. So let us get as much as we can. ‘But look; now she’s talking of substantive solutions’ we are not bargaining for substantive solutions at all. We want this happy state of affairs where we are in occupation of the North, we’re getting all these reductions and embargoes and fishing rights and all…that’ll keep our people also reasonably happy, we would consolidate ourselves…’ it was clear when the correspondence moved to that point that Prabhakaran was ducking and dodging and saying ‘no, no, not yet, we want more of this, and more of that’. Then he issued an ultimatum at the end of March, ‘if you don’t give me this, that and the other…’ he didn’t say what he’ll do, he tailed off into ‘if you don’t give…’ that was the kind of notice he was giving. And then, April 19th, what does he do? He goes and hammers two ships in the Port of Trincomalee. My reading of that is, that they were simply not ready and not willing to enter into any kind of substantive talks with a view to resolving the whole matter fully and finally. They were not. And then Eelam War III started. Now in a war situation what do you do? Does anybody say that we were the transgressors or that we were the ones who launched the war? Nobody can possibly say that. So we had to retaliate – we had to defend. Now when you defend, there is no use defending a static situation, the obvious thing to do now in view of the declaration of war, was to try to re-take the peninsula, so one event led to another. Defending didn’t mean just sitting where you are, because they had declared war. They said ‘this is Eelam War III’ if one reads the news reports of that time, Prabhakaran was saying, ‘this is the final war’. Final for what? ‘We are going to consolidate our position in the North and East, we have the North, and we’re going to take the East’. Now the unilateral ceasefire you referred to. In 1999 around September and October they started a massive military campaign in the Vanni and they took Killinochchi etcetera and they were very successful and then it went through the December ‘99 Presidential Election and their strategy was perfectly clear they wanted the UNP to come into power …Why? Because they had written off President Kumaratunga now as a bad bet, because she is the one who took away the jewels in the crown - that was in 1996 - it was a tremendous blow to Prabhakaran’s prestige, vanity, to his dreams – everything. So they had written her off. Now they wanted some other party in this game. So they turned to the UNP. I know exactly the period when this happened and how it happened…when they made overtures to meet the opposition of that time. Then in 1999, their strategy was, ‘This lady must be defeated at the elections, failing that, she must be killed.’ So up to about November 1999, they professed to be unconcerned with the result of the election. On the premise that this is another country and we’re not bothered. But that was not the truth, they were watching it very very carefully and their soundings are probably better than the sounding of the political parties in the South. By about November they came to the conclusion that she is winning and they began a campaign in the East for the UNP candidate. By December 18th they realised, that she cannot be defeated in the election - so the assassination attempt. Now coming into the first quarter of 2000, the military campaign goes on. And it culminates in their taking Elephant Pass in April. Then in May, they were at the gates of Jaffna. The message that came to us through the Norwegians was that, the LTTE had written off peace completely until they got back Jaffna. However their attempts to take Jaffna failed, and the offensive stalled. Then around June/July they started sending feeble signals, ‘Now we can talk about talks’. Then around August they suddenly said ‘no’. Why? Because a General Election was coming around in October 2000 and they wanted to wait and see what would happen. They were hoping that the UNP would win. October 10th came and went. Now they were faced with a President in power for a 2nd term of 6 years and a Parliament for another 6 years. So they sent for the Norwegians to meet the great man himself – November 1st. Because they’re pragmatic – they realised they have to deal with this government after all. Prabhakaran met the Norwegians on the 1st of November…he gives no idea what the next step would be. The Norwegians told me in the 1st week of December, ‘We don’t know what the next step is going to be,’ but, they said, ‘We’ll give you one piece of advice, never do anything unilaterally.’ They said, ‘Going by our experience, this unilateral business is not acceptable, because it raises hopes; it places one party in a corner straight away and compels that party to respond. And that party responds with ill grace because it is taken by surprise. Then expectations are raised – expectations are dashed usually because there’ll be some break in this whole thing, why? Because it has not been mutually agreed, it is forced upon somebody. So the Norwegians said, ‘Our advice is, don’t do anything unilaterally. Even the smallest step taken mutually is much better’. That advice was very much in my mind. Then came the 23rd of December, I was away in India and the news came almost out of the blue that a unilateral ceasefire had been declared by the LTTE. I called the Norwegians immediately, but they were not aware, they said they were not told. I reminded them of the advice they had given me on the 1st week of December before I had left. They said, ‘Yes, but you have to respond as best as you think, we cannot advise you.’ And the Norwegians were very upset. Let me again give you the sequence of events. In late 1999, they tried to assassinate the President. In the 1st quarter of 2000 they conducted a huge military campaign. They told the Norwegians they’re not interested in peace talks now, not until and after they retake Jaffna. When they failed to take Jaffna they made feeble attempts through the Norwegians to recommence negotiations. That was around June and July 2000. Then there was a lull during the run up to October 2000 General Elections, when the results of the elections were not what they expected and did not suit them…. Prabhakaran on the 1st of November meets the Norwegians. On the 23rd of December the LTTE almost out of the blues declares a unilateral ceasefire, which not even Norway, [the facilitator – now very much on-board] was informed of. The Government of the day could not have in any event accepted this unilateral offer.
|
Today's Stories
| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Contact Information: Send mail to 