Sri Lanka
will just be a sovereign shell- Kadirgamar
[May 8, 2003 - 11.00 GMT]
MP Lakshman Kadirgamar in
Parliament said today Sri Lanka’s sovereignty is steadily and visibly
eroding. He said since the Ceasefire Agreement was signed in February last
year the country has been facing the risk of being reduced to a nominal
sovereign state.
In response to a
statement made in Parliament by Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe, May
6, Kadirgamar said, “Soon Sri Lanka will be a sovereign shell, the
major attributes to a sovereign State – the capacity to govern, to resolve
justiciable issues, to enforce the law, to protect its citizens throughout
the entirely of its territory are being drained away by stealth,
fractured by assault and worn down by attrition.”
He stressed that
the structural flaws in the Ceasefire Agreement pointed out by President
Kumaratunga were now being “dramatically revealed
as events unfold on the ground and at sea. The burning issue of the day is
the question of the sea.”
In its
initial discussion paper on April 25, the SLMM had asked that the Sri
Lankan Government and especially its Navy to recognize the LTTE Sea Tigers
as a de facto naval unit.
Kadirgamar said the
country’s concern today is the question of the sea. “The SLMM has cited the
Oxford English dictionary meaning of the de facto (‘existing as a
fact although it may not be legally accepted as existing’) to justify its
proposal. A criminal gang may exist as a fact. Does the Police force have to
‘recognize’ it; and having ‘recognized’ it what is the Police Force expected
to do – ignore it or pursue it and bring it to justice?”
Full text of the speech:
Mr. Speaker,
In January 2002 I had the
privilege of opening the debate for the Opposition on the Prime Minister's
policy statement. On that occasion I said that the Opposition would do
nothing to disturb the peace process that was just being resumed. The new
government must have time to settle in. We have kept that pledge. The Prime
Minister was generous enough, during one of our routine consultations, to
say so. I also said that the time will come when the substantive issues will
have to be addressed. We reserved our opinion on those issues. That time has
come. Hard issues have surfaced. They must be addressed. The Opposition owes
a duty to the people to raise them and address them.
Our contention is that
from the very signing of the Ceasefire Agreement on 22nd February
2002 the sovereignty of Sri Lanka has been steadily and visibly eroded to
the point where Sri Lanka is in danger of being reduced to a nominal
sovereign State. Soon Sri Lanka will be a sovereign shell, the major
attributes of a sovereign State - the capacity to govern, to resolve
justifiable issues, to enforce the law, to protect its citizens throughout
the entirety of its territory are being drained away by stealth, fractured
by assault and worn down by attrition. This process commenced, with, and is
being facilitated by, the Ceasefire Agreement itself, a structurally flawed
document whose imperfections have now been clearly revealed, and are being
deeply felt, as the weeks and months go by. The Prime Minister himself
recently said that the CFA is not a perfect document and that if he had
striven for perfection there might have been no Ceasefire at all. Yes, I
agree. But if the Prime Minister had thought it fit to consult the President
about the CFA before it was signed - which did not happen - some of those
imperfections could have been removed, and a better balanced document drawn
up, not only to serve the interests of the LTTE, but the interests of the
nation as a whole. A bipartisan approach to the problem could have been
established at an early stage. However, while the Prime Minister was
prepared to extend his trust and confidence unreservedly to the LTTE, even
to the extent of dismantling with unnecessary alacrity, the security
structures that had been erected to protect the city of Colombo - the
consequences of which the public are now beginning to understand - his
government did not extend an iota of trust and confidence to the Head of
State, the Head of Government, the Head of Cabinet and the
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces over the so-called peace process.
Instead, the Government embarked upon a campaign of vituperative abuse
against the President and harassment of Opposition supporters which receded
only when it became clear that a 2/3rd majority in Parliament was not
forthcoming for certain Constitutional amendments.
Within a few days of the
signing of the CFA the President outlined in a letter to the Prime Minister
some of the flaws in the Agreement. They were as follows:-
1. The question of
naval operations. Article 1.2 of the CFA itemizes a number of prohibited
military operations, including "offensive naval operations". Article 1.3
graciously permits the Sri Lanka Armed Forces to continue "to perform their
legitimate task of safeguarding the sovereignty and territorial integrity of
Sri Lanka without engaging in offensive naval operations". How is the Navy
to safeguard the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka if it is
prohibited from engaging in offensive operations against the LTTE if
required? If a suspicious ship approaches our shores laden with arms, defies
challenge and inspection and opens fire on the Navy, and the Navy sinks that
ship, is that a prohibited offensive operation? If not, is it a defensive
operation? If it is a defensive operation, then what is an offensive
operation? If the Navy gives chase in the open seas to an LTTE ship carrying
arms, in exercise of the right of hot pursuit, to prevent it from landing
those arms on our shores, is that an offensive or defensive operation? Why
was this grey area created in the CFA? In the course of a statement made by
the Prime Minister at Vavuniya on 22nd February 2002 when he
signed the CFA - Mr. Prabhakaran having signed it the previous day in the
presence of the Norwegian Ambassador - he said: "The Army, Navy and Air
Force will have the right to intercept the illegal movement of arms into Sri
Lanka". What does "intercept" mean? Could there be interception by offensive
naval operations, in which case there is a contradiction between the CFA and
the Prime Minister's statement. Why could not the Prime Minister's oral
statement in Vavuniya have been incorporated into the CFA itself? Did the
LTTE object? What was the Norwegian position on this issue? The Prime
Minister's statement in Vavuniya being outside the CFA naturally does not
bind the LTTE. Did the Prime Minister seriously believe that the LTTE could
be trusted not to smuggle arms by sea into Sri Lanka, so that the meaning of
the expression "offensive naval operations" would never have to be tested?
(Two) Under Article 3:2
of the CFA if a dispute arises on a question involving the interception of
illegal arms (for instance, what is an offensive naval operation?) it will
be the Head of the Monitoring Mission, a foreign national, who will be "the
final authority regarding interpretation of the Agreement". Thus, the
jurisdiction of the Courts of Sri Lanka has been ousted on a question so
vital to national security and the protection of the territorial integrity
and sovereignty of Sri Lanka.
(Three) Articles
1.4, 1.5 and 1.6 of the CFA deal with the "drawing up of demarcation lines
regarding defence localities in all areas of contention". The parties are
required to provide information to the Monitoring Mission about their
defence localities. In the event of disagreement between the parties the
demarcation lines will have to be drawn by the Head of the Monitoring
Mission who is "the final authority regarding interpretation of this
Agreement". Article 2.7 refers to the establishment of checkpoints to
facilitate the flow of goods, and the movement of civilians on the "lines
of control". The "line of control" is a highly evocative expression in
our region and elsewhere in the world where lines of control and demarcation
have been source of confusion, bitterness and tragedy. Inevitably, a line of
control becomes a line of division, of separation. This is the first time in
the history of post independence Sri Lanka that a foreign government has
been authorized to draw demarcation lines on the soil of Sri Lanka. The
submission of such matters to the binding authority of a single individual
appointed by a foreign government is wholly inconsistent with the
sovereignty of Sri Lanka which is vested in its People and is declared by
the Constitution to be inalienable.
(Four) The powers and
functions which by this Agreement are vested in the Norwegian Government
travel far beyond the role of a facilitator of the envisaged negotiations
towards a political agreement. The Norwegian Government has now been cast in
the role of a mediator or arbitrator, and the Monitoring Mission has been
given the role of a judge, in the resolution of disputes between the parties
which is not the basis on which Norwegian assistance was sought in the first
place. The nature of the Norwegian Government's mandate has changed to such
an extent, its role has become so inflated, as to make it incompatible with
the sovereign status of Sri Lanka.
(Five) In the light of
the verified evidence coming in from various LTTE controlled areas,
especially in the East, relating to extortion, intimidation, abduction and
harassment of civilians, much of it against members of the Muslim community
but extending also to the Tamil and Sinhalese communities in these areas, we
surely have to ensure that our people are protected by the strict
application of Article 2.1 of the CFA which expressly prohibits such acts.
Among the six districts (Jaffna, Mannar, Vavuniya, Trincomalee, Batticaloa
and Ampara) in which the Monitoring Mission maintains a presence and local
monitoring committees have been established, Kilinochchi and Mulaitivu,
which are LTTE-controlled, are not included. This means that if "hostile
acts against the civilian population including such acts as torture,
intimidation, abduction, extortion and harassment", referred to in Article
2.1, are committed in those two districts the Monitoring Mission and the
local committees cannot intervene to help our citizens who live in these
areas. We have thus recognized and legitimised an enclave in those two areas
where the Government's writ does not run. What does this do to our
sovereignty over the entirety of our territory ?
(Six) What about the
plight of children forcibly recruited by the LTTE? This odious practice is
continuing. The evidence gathered by reputable national and international
sources is irrefutable and depressing. Sri Lanka has been in the forefront
of the international campaign against the conscription of child combatants.
There are many treaties and international resolutions on this subject. This
is a matter which gravely troubles the conscience of mankind. The LTTE has
given to the United Nations, but disregarded in practice, assurances that
they will not recruit under-age children. Can we, I ask the House, be so
callous, so cynical that in the pursuit of peace, we are willing to
compromise the rights of these children, to condone the brutal treatment
meted out to them and their parents ?
(Seven) The
extensive freedom of movement for "political work" in Government -
controlled areas in the North and the East granted to LTTE members under
Article 1.13 is not afforded to others (political parties, for instance) who
might wish to do "political work" in LTTE - controlled areas in the North
and the East. In a democratic society this is a totally indefensible
distinction, violative of the Constitution, between one group of political
parties and another. Democratic parties like the EPDP which entered the main
stream of national politics many years ago now find themselves at a
considerable disadvantage in relation to the LTTE. Disarmed by the CFA they
are at the mercy of the LTTE. They have lost a number of their cadres. The
government appears to be unconcerned with these terrible violation of the
CFA. Is the government unwilling or unable to help the EPDP to protect its
cadres ? Has the government abdicated its sovereign right, its duty, to
bring the culprits to justice even if they be the LTTE?
(Eight) This erosion of
sovereignty to which I have referred must also be viewed against the
backdrop of the significant omission in the Agreement of any reference to
any assurance given that negotiations for a political settlement will be
commenced by the parties by a fixed date and concluded by an agreed date.
Even the apparent suspension of the authority of the State reflected in this
document could lead to the accentuation of the movement towards secession on
which the Agreement is singularly silent despite the innumerable "confidence
building measures" which have been explicitly stated with great
particularity. In his statement to the House in January 2002 the Prime
Minister said: "After formalising the basic Agreement as regards peace
talks, the talks should be held within a definite time frame between the
Government and the LTTE". Nearly 15 months have passed. Where is the time
frame ? It is nowhere in sight.
The structural flaws in
the Ceasefire Agreement to which I referred at the opening of my speech are
now being dramatically revealed as events unfold on the ground and at sea.
The burning issue of the day is the question of the sea. In its so-called
initial discussion paper the Head of the Nordic Monitoring Mission made a
series of proposals which the Opposition parties , in their press release of
25th April, have described as "preposterous". One of them was
that "in the spirit of the CFA the government of Sri Lanka, and especially
its Navy, should recognise the LTTE Sea Tigers as a de facto naval unit."
Another was that "the LTTE should be excluded from the law concerning
limitations on the horse power of outboard motors". Yet another was that
"the Sri Lanka Navy and the LTTE Sea Tigers should have specific marked
exercise and training areas at sea, designed for navigation training and for
live firing exercises as well".
These propositions can be
faulted on a number of grounds:
(One) Is it "in the
spirit of the CFA" that the LTTE should systematically smuggle arms into the
country ? If not, why should it be "in the spirit of the CFA" that the Navy
should recognise the LTTE as a de facto naval unit?
(Two) The SLMM has cited
the Oxford English Dictionary meaning of de facto ("existing as a
fact although it may not be legally accepted as existing") to justify its
proposal. A criminal gang may exist as a fact. Does the Police force have to
"recognise" it; and having "recognized" it what is the Police Force expected
to do - ignore it or pursue it and bring it to justice ? The plain fact is
that the LTTE naval unit is an illegal entity. No country in the world has
two navies. To which country does the LTTE's naval unit belong ? De facto
recognition by a sovereign State of an illegal entity which mounts a
challenge to the authority of the State is only a whisker away from the
achievement of de jure status by that officially recognized illegal entity.
(Three) When the CFA was
entered into there were no areas marked out at sea for training exercises
and live firing by the LTTE and the Navy. The Navy made no such concessions
to the LTTE. The preservation of the balance of forces is said to be one of
the principal concepts underlying the Ceasefire Agreement. If that be so,
does not the delimitation one of these zones at sea disturb that balance.
(Four) In any event, why
should a sovereign State hand over to an illegal entity an exclusive zone
that derogates from its sovereignty? The real problem is that the government
of the day is by its conduct, by its palpable anxiety to accommodate even
the most unreasonable demands of the LTTE, encouraging the LTTE to believe
that it is a legal entity with legal rights.
(Five) Even if the
exercise and live firing areas are within our territorial waters, live
firing will create serious practical problems. Indian fishing boats
habitually enter our territorial waters in large numbers. What would happen
if they enter the LTTE zone during live firing practice ? There could be a
major rupture in our relations with India, especially with Tamil Nadu. The
Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu has clearly made known her deep concern that
LTTE craft are capturing Indian fishermen. A shooting incident in a LTTE
zone recognized by the government of Sri Lanka could have disastrous
consequences on our relations with India and Tamil Nadu. Moreover, fishing
craft belonging to other countries - China, Japan, South Korea - enter our
waters on legitimate business. We must remember what recently happened to a
Chinese trawler. If the "armed criminal gang unknown to Sri Lanka "which is
said by the Head of the Monitoring Mission to be prowling our coastal waters
enters the LTTE zone will there be a shoot out between these two illegal
entities ? We would be encouraging gang warfare at sea.
(Six) Live firing could
be with short range or long range weapons. The LTTE has 23 millimeter guns
mounted on their naval craft with a range of 6 kms. If these guns are fired
within the exercise zone the bullets could go beyond the zone and hit
innocent ships fishing or cruising just outside our territorial waters.
(Seven) We allow India to
use our airspace above our territorial waters. When LTTE live firing is
going on are we to tell the Indian government that our air space will be
closed to them ? Would this not be an unfriendly, hostile act towards a
neighbour that has proscribed the LTTE?
(Eight) When the CFA was
entered into the LTTE was limited to outboard motors of 40 horse power
maximum. The Nordic proposal is that they be allowed the use of outboard
motors of unlimited capacity. This will allow the LTTE legitimately to
acquire inshore craft, gunboats, fast attack craft and off shore patrol
craft which are used by blue water navies. During the British colonial
period there was only one navy in our region. With the independence of India
and Sri Lanka two navies emerged - the Indian and Sri Lankan. Now is there
to be a third navy with a license to expand at will ? Again, I ask the
question to which sovereign State does that navy belong ?
Our Navy Commander has
reacted strongly to the Nordic proposals. He has said : "The Sea Tiger arm
of the LTTE is not a legitimate organisation or force to carry weapons and
ammunitions at sea according to international laws at sea and also in the
territorial waters of Sri Lanka which are controlled by the Sri Lanka navy
as per 1.7 of the CFA"; "at the time the MOU was signed it was very clear
that the Sri Lanka navy was in total control of the sea and is the only
legitimate force at sea. Hence, the issue of a de facto force is of no
relevance. At the end of peace talks some day, even if Federal status is
given to the North and East, there will be only one navy and that is the Sri
Lanka navy. Therefore, excluding the Sea Tigers from the normal law of the
country is unacceptable and out of the question"; the Monitor"s proposal
that the parties vessels should be marked in accordance with the UN
Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982) implies, according to the Navy
Commander, that "LTTE Sea Tigers are on par with the Sri Lanka navy which is
not so. Therefore, the proposal is totally unacceptable"; "as for the
proposed confidence building measure that "the Sri Lanka navy and the LTTE
Sea Tigers should permit observers from the other party on board their
vessels while conducting exercises and training", the Navy Commander says
the "proposal is not possible. Refraining from the violation of the CFA,
while at sea off Iranativu on 17th July 2002 and Delft on the 6th
February, 2003, by the LTTE itself would be a confidence building measure
between the parties"; with regard to the Nordic proposal that "neither the
SLN nor the LTTE Sea Tigers should conduct offensive or aggressive
operations and movements at sea and that the minimum distance between the
parties vessels should be kept to one nautical mile," the Navy Commander
says the "Sri Lanka navy has the right to dominate, and to free movement, at
sea because it has to safeguard the sovereignty and territorial integrity of
the country and also in conformity with Article 1.3 of the CFA"; with regard
to exercise and training areas, the Navy Commander says the territorial
waters and the contiguous zone up to the economic zone is under Sri Lanka
navy control. No other party can be allowed to conduct military training at
sea since it is against the Constitution and sovereignty of the country and
Article 1.3 of the CFA".
The government, in
presenting its response to the SLMM paper, modified the Navy Commander's
response in several respects - important among them being the government's
willingness to allow the LTTE to conduct training and exercise within a
designated area (which the Navy Commander was opposed to) but without the
right to live firing. The SLMM's adjusted proposals return to its initial
working paper. It reposes a training and exercise area for the LTTE with
live firing rights and prohibits both the SLN and the LTTE Sea Tigers from
"offensive or aggressive operations and movements at sea".
The Opposition has
already made it clear in its press release of 25th April, and now reiterates
its position on the floor of the House, that the Opposition parties
wholeheartedly support the Navy Commander in his opposition to the proposal
of the Monitoring Mission with regard to the status of the LTTE's Sea
Tigers. The Opposition has already stated, and now repeats, that it has no
confidence in the competence and impartiality of the Monitoring Mission. The
Opposition proposes that the Monitoring Mission should be -recomposed.
I turn now Mr. Speaker,
to that other major security question of the day -the High Security Zones.
The LTTE wants the Army to withdraw from these zones to accommodate
internally displaced persons (IDP's). Major General Fonseka, the Northern
Security Forces Commander, supported by the Army Commander, has said in a
report last December that while appreciating the urgent need to resettle
civilians in these zones that process should go hand in glove with a
de-escalation process agreed between the government and the LTTE; no risks
should be taken to weaken the safety environment by making the zones
vulnerable; security can be relaxed only in stages i.e. disarming of LTTE
cadres and decommissioning of LTTE long range weapons. The Ministry of
Defence has confirmed that the 152 Army camp in the peninsula have been
reduced to 88.
The government has hired
the services of a retired Indian General, General Nambiar, to advise it on
security matters. In his report of last December he has said that "SLA
Commanders in the field as also at headquaters, appear to be unanimous in
the firm conviction that if civilians are allowed unrestricted re-entry in
these areas, LTTE cadres would infiltrate, establish their control even if
only covertly in the initial stages, and seriously compromise the ability of
the SLA to conduct operations should the peace process break down. Any
vacation of these areas is therefore perceived as dereliction of their
responsibility towards the troops and the country's security." Therefore,
General Nambiar has proposed that "as things stand it would appear that any
review of the scope and content of the High Security Zones will only come
about if the LTTE deposits its weapons to neutral supervision and initiates
measures to withdraw from frontline positions into nominated areas. Such a
step would provide a measure of reassurance to the SLA that surprise LTTE
attacks may be discounted. Similarily, there would need to be some
reassurance that there would be no coercion of civilians and officials by
LTTE cadres given access to areas on dismantling of the zones. "General
Nambiar in his first report has completely supported General Fonseka's
position. Indeed, the last Head of the SLMM also stated, supporting General
Fonseka, that during a ceasefire the balance of forces should not be
disturbed, that if the Army were to withdraw from the zones it would place
the Army at a disadvantage. General Nambiar has also said that there are
rumours that in a Federal structure the LTTE might be allowed a separate
Army. He says; "In my view any such remour should be scotched at this very
stage by the Prime Minister or Minister of Defence making it absolutely
clear that no matter what constitutional system is finally agreed upon there
can be only one Army for the country, namely the Sri Lanka Army".
For some mysterious
reason the Government Commissioned General Nambiar to prepare a second
report even before the first report had been discussed with the relevant
security authorities. I understand that the second report is ready. General
Nambiar has returned to Colombo. Between the two reports General Nambiar has
been visited more than once by important Government personalities. If there
are any substantial changes in the second report serious questions will
arise. General Nambiar is not the representative of the Government of India
He is a private consultant engaged by the government in his private
capacity.
Mr. Speaker, Sri Lanka
has become a carnival ground for international players, a sort of Hawkers
Street for foreign experts peddling their wares. Do we really need foreign
experts to advise us on how to protect the territorial integrity and
sovereignty of the State. Surely, our own Service Commanders, native to our
soil, know best what needs to be done.
What we in the Opposition
say to these worthy experts, there are many from different nationalities,
who come to advise the government is this please remember that the
Sovereignty of Sri Lanka is precious to us its citizens, to the members of
this House, to our people. It may be a plaything in the hands of others, to
us it is not a marketable commodity; it is not negotiable; it cannot be
compromised. If any of these expert reports make recommendations that
impinge on our sovereignty we of the Opposition will be duty bound by our
people to denounce such reports whoever the author may be. He who pays the
piper calls the tune.
The Prime Minister in his
statement referred to a "safety-net of the international community" and "a
firm expression of views by our friendly countries including the United
States, UK Japan, France and India". They have certainly made, and with the
United States and India, in particular, strong made, statements in support
of our territorial integrity and sovereignty . The United States has warned
the LTTE that it must renounce violence, abandon the notion of a separate
State and embrace the concept of a plural society if it is to gain
international legitimacy and acceptance. Is it not a great shame that our
government has never made a statement of that nature ? How does the
government expect other countries to uphold our sovereignty when it is shy
or doing so itself ? But what is this safety net ? The Prime Minister must
tell the House what it is ? It is important for the House to know. Are there
any secret understandings ? Will an aircraft carrier come our way if
hostilities break out again?
The Prime Minister has
said that in consultation with all parties the government will proceed to
develop a "road map" towards the objective of devolution and that it is open
to wide-ranging discussions on many issues - the core issues. We seem to
have heard this before. Is it true ? If so it is welcome. The hour is late
but not too late to make the process of consultation inclusive which it is
not at the moment. In the meantime the Opposition is of the view that we are
moving inexorably towards the day when Sri Lanka will no longer be a
sovereign State.
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