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Sri Lanka is the Chairman of SAARC, the
world’s most populous region. The importance
of SAARC today is also evidenced by the
presence of powerful observer states,
ranging from the USA to China and Iran.
The successful holding of SAARC under the
chairmanship of President Rajapaksa is no
small deal when one recalls that a previous
SAARC summit (in the early ‘90s) was subject
to absenteeism, in effect a soft boycott, by
a single crucial player, leaving the rest of
the region to turn up in solidarity. No such
thing happened this time. It was a spectacle
of a broadly united South Asia under Sri
Lanka’s leadership, states Dayan Jayatilleka,
strategic analyst, political commentator and
diplomat, in an article that studies the
realities of Sri Lanka’s role as an organic
component of Asia, the fastest growing, most
confident region of the world, and debunking
the myth of Sri Lanka’s international
isolation as claimed by many western and
pro-western observers.
The Final War for Tamil Eelam had become the
final war for the reunification of Sri
Lanka. This contradiction between the West’s
policy of the continuation of or return to
its pacifistic policy of appeasement of the
Tigers as represented by the CFA, came up
against the Sri Lankan peoples’ nationalist,
patriotic and anti-fascist determination to
defeat LTTE fascism and liberate their
country once and for all, states Jayatilleka.
Here is the text of Dayan
Jayatilleka’s article:
The SAARC Summit
and myth of Lanka’s international isolation
The successful holding of SAARC under the
chairmanship of President Rajapaksa is no
small deal when one recalls that under
President Premadasa - and I would say, due
to no fault of his- a previous SAARC summit
(in the early ‘90s) was subject to
absenteeism, in effect a soft boycott, by a
single crucial player, leaving the rest of
the region to turn up in solidarity.
No such thing happened this time. It was a
spectacle of a broadly united South Asia
under Sri Lanka’s leadership.
The fastest growing, most confident region
of the world is Asia— and Sri Lanka is an
organic component of it.
President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s first act in
the international arena after assuming the
chairmanship of SAARC was to attend the
opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympics,
showcase of China’s wonderful synthesis of
ultra-modern transformation and
millennia-old tradition, and great gateway
for East-West interaction.
At the WTO talks in Geneva India and China
simply refused to blink in the face of
Western pressure to agree to terms which the
Asian powers and developing countries
perceived as unbalanced. At the Security
Council, South Africa and Vietnam supported
Russia and China in blocking attempts to
shift the global goal posts in the cases of
Zimbabwe and Sudan.
At the NAM meeting in Tehran the Foreign
Ministers of 115 countries reaffirmed the
inalienable right of all countries to
peaceful nuclear energy, prompting the
Iranian President and the Foreign Minister
to urge certain countries to “get the
message”.
An adventuristic return to the Cold War in
Europe could lead Russia to understand that
its defensive geo-strategic interests in the
face of encirclement are best served by
realizing its destiny as a Euro-Asian power
and strengthening its strategic ties with
the East. In any event this unfortunate New
Cold War with its short sighted
overstretching of a West already caught up
in two shooting wars and an economic crisis
cannot but enhance the position and
prospects of Asia.
Problem Areas
Sri Lanka’s international relations have
problematic zones, of course. The relations
with the EU are troubled. One does not know
whether the EU renews GSP Plus or not.
But the EU is not the international
community, and it is sad when Sri Lankans
are psychologically dependent as to think
so. It is not even all of Europe, as Russia
readily reminds it.
I’ve heard the same story so many times.
It’s the narrative of the nationalist
government in the Third World - left wing,
centrist or right wing nationalist-that
started out with the blessings of the benign
West, but soon blew it due to its own
extremism, petulance or personality cult.
The tale is retold from post-revolutionary
Cuba through Mahathir’s Malaysia up to
contemporary Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia.
The story has Right and Left variants: in
the former version the nationalist
government in the Third World was disguising
its malign intentions initially, taking the
gullible West for a ride, but soon unmasked
itself and revealed its true character.
In its left wing version, the nasty West
drove the innocent nationalists into the
arms of the West’s competitors.
Establishment social scientists use a model
derived from the study of the French
Revolution to posit a series of stages, in
which the so-called rational moderates (a
Prime Minister, Finance Minister or Foreign
Minister) is replaced by the so-called
irrational radicals (in the case of Cuba,
the landmark was supposedly the resignation
of President Urrutia), and the West awaits
or works towards the next stage in which
there is a backlash against the radicals
(who have inevitably messed up the economy)
and sanity is restored, with all being well
once again, in the world.
What is most depressing is when the
country’s own puppet politicians and
commentators begin to echo these versions of
the story.
The truth of the story is of course very
different. Superficially it is usually true
that the nationalist government/regime in
question started out with a seemingly
positive relationship with the West. But the
deeper truth is that underlying this frail
truce, are real contradictions between the
interests or perceived interests of the two
sides, the nationalists and this or that
Western power. In that sense the distancing
or clash is inevitable.
Anti-Sri Lankan
Spin
According to one reading the EU ban on the
LTTE is evidence of the goodwill that the
West had for Sri Lanka even under the
Rajapaksa administration, which was later
squandered by the latter.
While a superficial reading would appear to
support this, a deeper one would not. The
crucial question remain unasked: what was
the West’s policy towards Sri Lanka at the
time the Rajapaksa administration came to
office? And what was the policy of the
Rajapaksa administration towards the West?
The West’s policy framework for Sri Lanka
was rather simple: the CFA as it was
operating in other words, peace at any cost
with the Tigers. Whatever they did, the Sri
Lankan state should not go to war, and if it
did slip into war, it should pull back as
soon as possible to negotiations.
If Sri Lanka is winning the war it should
negotiate with a weakened LTTE, eschewing a
drive for complete and final defeat of the
enemy. In short, Sri Lanka was expected to
desist from the policy the West adopts
towards terrorism and adopt a policy which
is the exact opposite.
Throughout the years of cold blooded murder
and expansionism, the West did nothing to
actively deter the Tigers. The so-called
safety net did not exist. On the other hand
President Rajapaksa came to office on a
nationalist ticket, representing public
sentiment against appeasement and national
humiliation.
The dominant Western approach was predicated
on an assumption that President Rajapaksa
explicitly and repeatedly rejected: that of
“good terrorists” and “bad terrorists”, with
the former being non-Islamic and non-Marxist
while the latter are those who claim to be
Islamic.
This was the objective contradiction
complicating the relationship between the
West and the new administration in Colombo.
The EU ban on the LTTE was the result of two
intersecting factors: the murder of Foreign
Minister Kadirgamar and the West’s need to
reprimand the Tigers for sabotaging the
Tamil vote that could have accrued to its
favourite son, former PM Ranil
Wickremesinghe.
The muted nature of the West’s response to
the Kadirgamar murder and the opposition
even within the EU to the ban, were telling
evidence of the real attitude.
When the Tigers went to war, launching
claymore attacks which consumed dozens of
soldiers and sailors, including off-duty
ones, the West did nothing. During the
Mavilaru crisis, when the Tigers finally bit
off more than they could chew, cutting of
the water supply of tens of thousands of
peasants, the West was determined that Sri
Lanka should not counter attack and that the
desultory Norwegian mediation was the only
way to go.
The End of
Appeasement
The LTTE’s planning for The Final War which
took the form of the LTTE’s withdrawal from
talks in April 2003 and its subsequent
sabotage of the Wickremesinghe candidacy,
sank the policy of appeasement.
The LTTE’s aggression produced its
dialectical result: the resurgent patriotism
which brought President Rajapaksa to power.
The contradiction was sharpened by the
Tigers’ military attacks on a fledgling
Rajapaksa administration. With Mavil Aru,
the policy of appeasement died, as the Sri
Lankan armed forces counterattacked. That
counterattack turned uninterruptedly into an
operation to liberate the vital Trincomalee
area.
The Final War for Tamil Eelam had become the
final war for the reunification of Sri
Lanka. This contradiction between the West’s
policy of the continuation of or return to
its pacifistic policy of appeasement of the
Tigers as represented by the CFA, came up
against the Sri Lankan peoples’ nationalist,
patriotic and anti-fascist determination to
defeat LTTE fascism and liberate their
country once and for all.
Whether the West was motivated by the
pressure of the Tamil Diaspora, or a bias
towards the minority Tamils (a hangover from
colonial days when the only armed rebellions
against British colonialism came from the
Sinhalese), or a soft corner for the Tigers
who were neither Islamic nor Marxist but a
possible instrumentality, or a determination
to replace a nationalist government with a
pro-Western puppet, one does not know.
What we do know is that the majority of the
Sri Lankan people had reached the end of
their tolerance for the West’s preference
and support for appeasement of the
aggressive LTTE, and was determined to
reassert their sovereignty and territorial
unity.
Relative Standing,
Comparative Performance
The golden age of Sri Lanka’s international
relations was the two decade long period
1956-1976. The ten years that followed were
a period of deviation from our natural Non
Aligned vocation and constituency; a period
of illusion and real isolation-unlike
today’s imaginary one. When Sri Lanka’s
airspace and sovereignty were violated, none
came to our defense.
A retrospective glance at the periods that
followed disproves the propaganda claim that
the Rajapaksa administration’s supposedly
unenlightened view on the ethnic issue is
responsible for a crisis in our external
relations.
Both President Premadasa and Kumaratunga
maintained a discourse that was explicitly
multiethnic, multilingual and
multi-religious, which did not prevent the
then UK High Commissioner from intruding in
our internal affairs to a degree that he was
declared persona non grata, and our
neighbour from absenting itself from the
SAARC summit.
President Kumaratunga’s projects for
devolution (excessive in 1995 and 1997,
appropriate in its year 2000 version) did
not generate assistance from our neighbour
in our greatest hour of need, during the
Tiger offensive on Jaffna in 2000. President
Kumaratunga was to express her dismay in an
interview given to Nirupama Subramanian of
the Hindu.
The recent disclosures by former UK High
Commissioner David Gladstone to the BBC’s
Sinhala Service give us a clue as to the
reality. The report says that: Mr. Gladstone
was expelled from Sri Lanka in 1991 by then
President Ranasinghe Premadasa accusing him
of interfering in Sri Lanka’s internal
affairs.
The former British High Commissioner did not
deny the accusation. The clear instructions
by the British government to interfere to
help protect human rights in Sri Lanka
marked a new chapter in very long tradition
of international diplomacy whereby diplomats
did not openly criticise their host
countries, according to Mr. Gladstone.
“Rules of diplomacy have actually changed. I
was thrust into the situation to pioneer (in
1991) a new approach to international
diplomacy while I was in Sri Lanka,” he
said.
This is the reality: a new approach which
marked a departure in a very long tradition
of international diplomacy; an approach
specific to the post-Cold war period,
politely referred to as Public Diplomacy.
The failure to obtain help from our closest
neighbour under the CBK Presidency in our
hour of need sheds light on a hard dual
reality of Sri Lanka in the world, which has
to be grasped by any lucid politician or
analyst.
Though the absence of a political reform
package does have a significance negative
effect on external perceptions of the
conflict and resultant behaviour, the
presence of such a package is no guarantee
of support.
The inner core of that reality is that there
is a contradiction between Sri Lanka’s
imperative need, and desire to win the war,
on the one hand, and the perceived interests
of certain sectors of the global system (and
sub-regional subsystem) on the other.
We must observe universal standards of human
rights because that is the right thing to
do, is beneficial to the country and is
counterproductive to do otherwise.
But we must not swallow Western propaganda
to the degree that we mistake the excuse for
the reason. Human rights violations are not
the reason for the gap between certain
Western countries and Sri Lanka.
Those who do not wish us to win the war
commit far more horrendous violations of
human rights and tolerate far more horrific
violations on the part of their allies. They
also take punitive measures against those
countries such as Cuba, which have never
committed atrocities in their military
operations.
We have been given no choice: if we wish to
carry the war forward to the victory that
the country requires and so richly deserves;
the victory that we have all sacrificed for,
then we have to accept a certain gap, a
certain degree of disconnect, a
contradiction not of our making, with those
who oppose that victory and this war.
We must ally with those who not merely
preach, but who support us or have no
problem with our striving for the
reunification of our country-a goal which is
now on the horizon.
(This
article represents the writer’s personal
opinions).
(Courtesy – “Daily News” –
August 21, 2008)
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