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After the fall of Kilinochchi, it is
clear that the situation has developed to a
point where no political bail-out package
can help Prabhakaran’s organisation come out
of its existential crisis — the gravest it
has faced in three decades of armed
struggle, said the Hindu editorial today.
“It is only a matter of short time before
the cadres of the LTTE are confined to the
jungles of Mullaithivu,” the editorial
added.
“The capture of Kilinochchi was delayed
owing to the presence of a large number of
civilians, torrential rains, and the
government’s determination to avert
collateral damage. President Rajapaksa has
done well to emphasise that the military
achievement was not a victory of “one
community over another” or a “defeat of the
North by the South” but “a decisive victory
over savage terrorism.”
Full text of the
editorial
Kilinochchi and after
On November 27, 2008, Velupillai Prabhakaran,
supremo of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil
Eelam, proclaimed in his annual Heroes’ Day
message that the Sinhala state was “living
in a dreamland of military victory.” He
promised that it was “a dream from which it
will awake.” A month earlier he had declared
the capture of Kilinochchi — the LTTE’s
administrative hub and de facto ‘capital’
following the loss of Jaffna in 1995 — to be
“a day dream of Rajapaksa.” The realisation
of this dream in the New Year is a body blow
from which there can be no recovery as far
as anyone knows. This is true in a political
as much as military sense. Militarily, the
LTTE has taken a continuous battering over
the past two years. President Mahinda
Rajapaksa did give it a window of
opportunity to return to the peace talks.
But after the success of the Mavil Aru
operation — provoked by the Tigers’ foolish
act of blocking the sluice gates — there was
no stopping the Sri Lankan armed forces. In
2007 they rapidly evicted the LTTE, which
had been fractured and weakened by the
Karuna revolt, from the province. More
surprisingly, over the past year the Sri
Lankan army, backed effectively by the air
force and navy, has made dramatic inroads
into LTTE-held territory in the Northern
Province. The capture of Kilinochchi was
delayed owing to the presence of a large
number of civilians, torrential rains, and
the government’s determination to avert
collateral damage. President Rajapaksa has
done well to emphasise that the military
achievement was not a victory of “one
community over another” or a “defeat of the
North by the South” but “a decisive victory
over savage terrorism.”
Post-Kilinochchi, the armed forces are all
set to zero in on the bases of the Tigers in
Elephant Pass and Muhamalai across the
Jaffna peninsula. It is only a matter of
short time before the cadres of the LTTE are
confined to the jungles of Mullaithivu. The
organisation will still have some residual
fighting capability — in the guerrilla mode
and also through its trademark human bomb
terrorism. The other resource it will be
counting on is the human shield within the
small territory it still holds. The Sri
Lankan government reckons that there are
about 100,000 civilians trapped behind the
LTTE lines but some other estimates put the
number considerably higher. Whatever be the
actual number, the basic needs and safety of
Tamil civilians in the Mullaithivu war zone
must be the paramount concern. President
Rajapaksa, who has instructed the armed
forces to follow a ‘Zero Civilian Casualty
Policy,’ has pledged that his government
would accept responsibility to ensure
civilian “safety and freedom” now and in the
future. The military victories need to be
consolidated, more or less simultaneously,
by addressing the legitimate grievances of
the Tamils and generating a consensus for an
enduring political solution to the ethnic
conflict. Meanwhile, it is clear that the
situation has developed to a point where no
political bail-out package can help
Prabhakaran’s organisation come out of its
existential crisis — the gravest it has
faced in three decades of armed struggle.
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