The conventional military game is up for the
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, or very
nearly so. That is the message sent out to
the world by the capture of the Tigers’ main
garrison town of Mullaithivu, situated on a
sliver of land between a lagoon and the
Indian Ocean, by the 59 division of the Sri
Lankan Army three weeks after the 57
division took Kilinochchi, said the Hindu
editorial today.
"With the territory controlled by Velupillai
Prabakaran’s organisation shrinking from
15,000 square km in August 2006 to 350
square km today, with its fighting cadre
strength believed to be down to about 1,000,
with its senior leaders hiding in pockets of
jungle or on the run, Army Commander Lt.
Gen. Sarath Fonseka was not exaggerating
when he announced that the 25-year war was
95% per cent over.” Desperate actions such
as blowing up a tank bund to flood a section
of the A-35 Paranthan- Mullaithivu main road
and adjacent areas, and laying landmines to
prevent civilians from fleeing to
government-controlled areas say it all about
the LTTE’s plight and character," the
editorial added.
Full text of the editorial
End game in Sri Lanka
The conventional military game is up for the
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, or very
nearly so. That is the message sent out to
the world by the capture of the Tigers’ main
garrison town of Mullaithivu, situated on a
sliver of land between a lagoon and the
Indian Ocean, by the 59 division of the Sri
Lankan Army three weeks after the 57
division took Kilinochchi. With the
territory controlled by Velupillai
Prabakaran’s organisation shrinking from
15,000 square km in August 2006 to 350
square km today, with its fighting cadre
strength believed to be down to about 1,000,
with its senior leaders hiding in pockets of
jungle or on the run, Army Commander Lt.
Gen. Sarath Fonseka was not exaggerating
when he announced that the 25-year war was
per cent over.” Desperate actions such as
blowing up a tank bund to flood a section of
the A-35 Paranthan-Mullaithivu main road and
adjacent areas, and laying landmines to
prevent civilians from fleeing to
government-controlled areas say it all about
the LTTE’s plight and character.
For the secessionist organisation, the last
30 months have been one unbroken series of
miscalculations and military debacles. The
Sri Lankan armed forces have been on a roll
ever since they tasted success in the Mavil
Aru operation — provoked by a severely
weakened LTTE’s foolish act of shutting the
sluice gates and denying water to more than
30,000 civilians — in the Eastern Province.
The real surprise has come in the Northern
Province where, beginning in March 2007, the
Sri Lankan army, air force, and navy have
simply decimated the Tigers. The army’s
offensive has come on several fronts. It
currently involves five offensive divisions
and three task forces rapidly closing in on
the top LTTE leaders and fighting cadres who
have nowhere to escape. What residual
fighting capability the organisation retains
in the guerrilla mode and through urban
terrorism remains to be seen. But there is
little doubt that politically speaking, the
game is up for Mr. Prabakaran and his
organisation — which is banned or designated
as terrorist in about 30 countries,
including India, the United States, the
United Kingdom, and in the latest instance
Sri Lanka.
It is certainly too late for any bailout
package, if that was ever on anybody’s
practical agenda. The immediate priority
must be ensuring the safety of Tamil
civilians, officially reckoned to be in the
range of 100,000 to 200,000, who the LTTE
evidently has no compunction in using as a
human shield. That is the most sensitive
humanitarian challenge before the Sri Lankan
government.
Assuming it will be met successfully so
that the offensive military operations,
including the final mopping up, can end in a
few weeks, President Mahinda Rajapaksa —
whose political stock in Sri Lanka’s South
can be expected to be sky-high — must ensure
that there is no triumphalism. Most
important, he must seize the moment to build
a national consensus on an enduring
political solution based on substantial
devolution of power to the Tamils within a
united Sri Lanka.
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