|
|
|
 |
 |
|||
|
Moving Beyond a Mutual Cessation of Hostilities The talk around town and the issue of the day is the Government’s MOU with the LTTE, that established a mutually agreed cessation of hostilities between the LTTE and the Government. There are several interesting features about the agreement, which are worth examining as is more importantly looking beyond ceasefire to the next steps of the peace process. The most important aspect of the ceasefire is the muted criticism it has received from the public, indicative perhaps of the war weariness and hopes for peace that is likely to be widely prevalent in society. More importantly perhaps President Kumaratunga has sounded strong words of caution regarding the agreement and also strongly disapproved of the rather clandestine manner in which the deal was worked out particularly with the President being presented with the text of the agreement only after it had been signed by the LTTE leader and hours before the Prime Minister was due to sign it. The cautionary words of the President has in some quarters been misunderstood as an opposition to the ceasefire, but the President in her eleven page letter to the Prime Minister makes clear that she is committed to ensuring a successful implementation of the agreement while being well aware of its significant weaknesses and more importantly is looking ahead at the next phases of the peace process. It is very clear that a ceasefire agreement is not a peace deal. Agreement on opening the A9 roadway and fishing rights in Northern waters does not constitute a resolution of the ethnic problem. Dealing with the demand for the rights and aspirations of the Tamil people, is untouched in the ceasefire MOU which in fact is the intent. Accordingly and as the Prime Minister stated in Vavuniya after signing the agreement it is important to realise that this is just the first step in a process and the path ahead is not easy. A ceasefire with the LTTE is certainly not historic. We have been here before, namely in 1995 when the then PA government entered into a ceasefire with the LTTE. The ceasefire lasted a few months and was broken by the attack by the LTTE on the naval vessels in Trincomalee and the rest as they say is history. But the present political arrangement namely that of both the major national parties enjoy state power through the executive presidency and through the cabinet of ministers is a unique political arrangement in post independent Sri Lanka provides the opportunity and the framework for a national consensus on a resolution of the ethnic problem. In that context the conduct of the Prime Minister and even the Norwegian facilitators in keeping the presidency in the dark regarding the text of the agreement is disappointing and more importantly short sighted. It is disappointing because while convenience might have dictated a secret deal, the modus of reaching agreement on the ceasefire ignored the constitutional prerogatives of the Executive President as the head of state, head of government, head of cabinet and commander in chief of the armed forces. It is short sighted because what has been the chief obstacle for a solution to the ethnic problem has been the obstructionist activities of the opposition, the most recent being the draft burning, foul mouthing and Singapore flying of the UNP then in opposition in August 2000 when the PA introduced wide ranging devolution of power as a new constitution in Parliament. Any peace deal requires the bi partisan support of both the major national parties and if the UNP’s strategy is to go it alone, it is both inherently risky in that it is an unsuccessful path already trod and also the squandering of a unique opportunity to bring about a national consensus on the ethnic problem and lift the resolution of the same out of the local political milieu and onto a different plane of consensual politics. Moving beyond the current ceasefire it is important that substantive talks begin while a momentum for peace exists and as the peoples’ expectations and hopes are built up. The political solution requires that it focus on the core issues of ensuring human rights and securing democracy and a free society within the framework of a united Sri Lanka. Within that context the forced conscription of children, extortion, threats and harassment against the civilian population by the LTTE is a cause for concern and as part of the confidence building measures they should desist from such activities. Further the gun running and re-arming via smuggling while engaging the Sri Lankan Navy on the high seas should also be discontinued. The two protagonists or the parties to the conflict or agreement as the MOU refers to the GOSL and the LTTE are still far apart on the substantive issues. The Government is presumably committed to a united, multi ethnic and democratic Sri Lanka while the LTTE is still publicly committed to carving out a separate state from within Sri Lanka which will in all likelihood be a totalitarian right wing dictatorship. The Sri Lankan state in theory at least has a commitment to ensuring that a totalitarian ethnic enclave is not carved out of its territory, i.e. protecting its territorial integrity. On the contrary many of the captains of industry that drive our nation’s engine of economic growth are likely to be of the opinion that we can also perhaps no longer afford to keep spending practically a billion dollars an year in safeguarding the Tamil people from the LTTE. A negotiated political compromise probably lie within these two extreme positions that of practically throwing in the towel and that of fighting the LTTE indefinitely. For the LTTE too the reality is they will never achieve a separate state solely by force of arms and negotiations would be required to reach a compromise that would witness significant devolvement of power to the regions, power sharing at the centre and self-determination short of separation. The writer, a private sector finance professional is also the official Presidential Spokesman.
|
|
Contact
Information: Send mail to