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JN
Dixit,
former Indian High Commissioner to Sri Lanka. The peace talks between the Sri Lankan government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) have been stalemated over the last three or four months because of various procedural and political reasons. The political reasons are, first, the delay by the Sri Lankan authorities in sending proposals for the interim governance of the northern and eastern provinces, including details of subjects to be delegated to the provincial authority. When the proposals were finally sent, the LTTE did not find them satisfactory. They are now in the process of submitting alternative proposals to the government for the first time since 1987. Second, the Sri Lankan government is concerned that the LTTE is violating the ceasefire agreement by setting up new camps, particularly in the eastern region of Trincomalee. The LTTE has not only strengthened its existing military bases in Trincomalee but also set up 13-14 new bases, despite the memorandum of understanding on the ceasefire stipulating against such moves by either side. The new LTTE bases are in addition to 14 others in the same region that have been strengthened. The new LTTE bases flank the Sri Lankan Army's military positions and can become launching pads for attacks, endangering the strategic Trincomalee port. The third problem is the profound division of opinion among Sri Lankan political parties and public opinion about the proposals for a compromise with the LTTE. The LTTE's counter proposals on the interim administration are likely to reveal the qualitative gap between their demands and the Sri Lankan government's offer. The Buddhist clergy, President Chandrika Kumaratunga and her party are deeply concerned about excessive compromises with the LTTE because they fear a division of their nation and creation of a separate Tamil state of Eelam. Meanwhile, the ground situation in terms of military capacities is in a flux and decidedly to the advantage of the LTTE. While the government forces remain engaged in their routine security duties, the LTTE has decidedly utilised the ceasefire to strengthen itself in terms of personnel as well as supplies. The LTTE now has a sufficient number of long-range weapons, including mortar and 120 mm artillery guns. It has converted the temporary transit bases and routes in Jaffna and in the east into permanent military bases. Its maritime activities around the northern and eastern coasts have been on the increase under the protection of the Tamil Tigers' navy, known as Sea Tigers. These maritime activities include transportation of cadres and materials disguised as fishermen and civilians. According to government sources, LTTE infiltrators and reconnaissance teams are utilising their freedom of movement to improve and expand their intelligence operations against the government. The LTTE is now in possession of specially rigged suicide boats. The guerrilla group has about 2,000-3,000 armed cadres in Jaffna, besides 1,550 in Trincomalee. The Sea Tigers have three attack gunboats and six suicide craft ready for operation in the eastern Sector. The LTTE also has micro-light aircraft that can be utilised for suicide attacks on military bases. On all counts, the LTTE has utilised the Norwegian-brokered ceasefire to enhance its cadres and regroup, to acquire more military supplies and to deploy its cadres in new positions with better equipment, putting the government forces on the defensive. The armed forces cannot take any counter action or pre-emptive operations against LTTE activities because of the ceasefire. Army officers are incrementally worried about these developments. The political and military wing of the LTTE is confident. It is dealing with the government forces more or less on an equal footing. LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran had been quoted as saying that if talks fail, the Tigers have the ability to revert to the military option. Despite the existence of other Tamil political parties and some such as the Eelam People's Democratic Party (EPDP) being represented in Parliament, the government has recognised the LTTE as the main representative of the Sri Lankan Tamils. This status has been internationally recognised due to the Norwegian exercise of accepting LTTE as the main negotiators from the Tamil's side. This was political realism but it has legitimised the LTTE's claims of being the sole representative of the Sri Lankan Tamils. The question arises as to why the LTTE participated in the Norwegian peace initiative and why it was continuing its participation despite its known strengths and uncompromising negotiating position on certain Tamil issues. The main reason is the US action in designating the LTTE as a terrorist organisation. Post September 11, the LTTE's position became incrementally vulnerable due to this label. External support to the organisation from the Tamil diaspora in western Europe, North America and the Asia Pacific was also affected by stringent punitive stipulations against organisations and entities supporting terrorist organisations, particularly those designated as such by the US government. So it is logical for the LTTE to take every step to shed its terrorist label to gain legitimacy as a political entity. But this objective will not make the LTTE compromise on some of its basic demands, which have been consistent for nearly three decades. The macro-level objective of the LTTE remains the creation of a separate Tamil state in Sri Lanka over a period of time. Whether this would be decisive to the security of Sri Lanka or the ethno-cultural unity of India is a legitimate question. The answer obviously has to be negative because the centrifugal forces generated by such an event can have cascading ramifications on sub-continental South Asia. The Sri Lankan government has the support of a majority of countries in the world to sustain its unity and territorial integrity, the only rider being that the government offer a compromise to the Tamils that is responsive to their political, cultural and economic aspirations. An additional relevant factor is that the world is not likely to endorse the LTTE's political and constitutional demands, which may border on the creation of a separate Tamil state. India should remain supportive of the peace process subject to these realities. India should also strengthen the Sri Lankan government in political and logistical terms so that it can negotiate with the Tigers from a position of strength in the coming weeks. (The writer is a former foreign secretary)
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