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by Namini Wijedasa
Speaking at an open forum organised by the Council for Public Policy, Dhanapala frankly admitted that he would like to set the record straight; to clarify doubts that even dedicated proponents of the peace process may entertain due to widespread misinformation. For the first time since the government and LTTE agreed on the draft Post-Tsunami Management Operations Structure, Dhanapala outlined in great detail the contents of the memorandum of understanding (MoU) and the events that had led to its drafting. Consultations are currently taking place within the government and there is no final decision. "From the content and tone of the president’s speeches... it is very clear she recommends to the country at large that the common structure, the joint mechanism, be established," Dhanapala emphasised. It was necessary for humanitarian reasons and for the positive impact it would have on the peace process. Natural response The joint mechanism was a natural response to a natural disaster. In the early days, LTTE cadres and the armed forced had worked spontaneously to help each other and civilians. The A9 road had remained open for 24 hours to allow relief goods through. On December 28, President Chandrika Kumaratunga’s secretary, W. J. S. Karunaratne, wrote to LTTE political wing leader S. P. Thamilchelvan inviting the rebels to join a high-level political committee that was discussing a collective response to relief, rescue and reconstruction. The government particularly needed LTTE cooperation in ensuring the delivery of assistance more efficiently and effectively in the north and east. The Tigers were welcomed, too, into district task forces that had begun to be established. Thamilchelvan responded positively on January 3. In his missive, he also referred to formulating a structure that would allow the LTTE and government to cooperate further in delivering humanitarian assistance to the people of the north and east. On December 30, there was a meeting between Dhanapala and Pulithevan, director of the LTTE peace secretariat. They discussed, in broad outlines, the kind of structure that might be established. Following Kumaratunga’s instructions, the government peace secretariat on January 7 began a series of negotiations with the LTTE. Seven rounds of talks were held in the "most professional, pragmatic and cordial atmosphere". The possibility was discussed of a structure that would include LTTE representatives, Muslim community representatives nominated by the Muslim parties, and representatives of the Sri Lanka Government. Major considerations The two delegations were primarily concerned about the equitable allocation of foreign assistance; and the efficient and effective delivery of aid through a discussion of project proposals based on needs assessments that were being conducted. On the part of the Sri Lankan Government, there had been two major considerations: "One was to ensure that the LTTE... which has not been very tolerant of other points of view, or indeed of the interests of minorities in the eastern province... should be held accountable," Dhanapala explained, "We were mindful that there had to be fullest democratic participation of the Muslims and of the Sinhalese of the eastern province, whose interests had to be safeguarded." "The second consideration was that there should be sufficient democratic space for the non-LTTE Tamil public, so that we were not necessarily having the LTTE alone to represent the Tamil community," he continued, "... that there would be space created in the structure for other parties to contribute towards this humanitarian structure." Norwegian involvement Discussions were held directly between the government and Tigers but this formula suddenly changed. On February 7, Kaushalyan — the LTTE’s Ampara-Batticaloa political leader — was assassinated. "Despite being condemned very strongly by the government, it (assassination) was seen by the LTTE as something... contributed to by the government," Dhanapala said. "As a show of protest, they broke off direct negotiations, requiring us to use the Norwegians." Thus far, the Norwegians had been observing the direct talks. Now, they started carrying messages between the two parties. They also helped develop compromises for difficult areas where there was no agreement. After two attempts, the Norwegian draft was finally acceptable (broadly speaking) to both sides. On April 28, President Kumaratunga was notified via telephone by Norwegian Foreign Minister Jan Petersen that the LTTE agreed to the draft. Kumaratunga subsequently kicked off intensive political dialogue within her coalition as well as outside. "She couldn’t do this earlier," Dhanapala pointed out. "If she had gone out on a limb to start consultations on the basis of a document that might have been rejected by the LTTE, she would have been made to look very foolish. "It would have been politically inconvenient for her to have engaged in such consultations." The joint mechanism The draft memorandum of understanding contains several preambular paragraphs describing Sri Lanka’s situation after the tsunami disaster. It emphasises the need for all communities to cooperate in tacking this common adversity. It asserts that the LTTE and the Government of Sri Lanka have a common interest in working together as far as the repairs and the reconstruction of the damage caused by the tsunami is concerned. Next is the three-tiered structure, the basis of which is a bottom-up approach. There are committees for the six affected districts of the north and east. These had been formed in the immediate aftermath of the tsunami and comprise government agents; representatives of all departments involved in post-tsunami reconstruction; district members of parliament from the Tamil National Alliance and other parties (where applicable); civil society representatives from the consortium of non governmental organisations; and members of international non governmental organisations. In some cases, members of UN organisations relevant to tsunami reconstruction are also involved. "This community structure worked well after the tsunami and, rather than reinvent the wheel, we decided to continue with the six district committees," Dhanapala related. The presence of INGOs and dual representatives injects a certain transparency into the district committees. "They are certain deterrents to any kind of overbearing behaviour by any members of the committee," Dhanapala observed. "We were very keen that the committee structure would be as open, as transparent, as democratic, as accountable and as inclusive as possible." Second tier The second tier is the regional committee, consisting of ten members. Five would be appointed by the LTTE, three by consensus among the Muslim parties and two appointed by the government of Sri Lanka. "I would like you to note that we are talking about LTTE nominees, we are talking about government of Sri Lanka nominees, and Muslim party nominees," Dhanapala specified. "We are not talking in ethnic terms about Tamils and Sinhalese and Muslims, in the terms we have been used to when talking about the peace process." "We have done this because we are not saying the LTTE are the sole representatives of the Tamils... in appointing five Tamils. Theoretically, it will be possible for the LTTE to appoint five persons from different ethnic groups. Indeed, it will be possible for the government of Sri Lanka to appoint two representatives from other ethnic groups outside the Sinhalese. Decision-making and voting "What is also important is that the principal decision-making will be consensus, as far as possible." Dhanapala asserted. "We would like this to be an opportunity for national integration and for decision-making to be done in a harmonious manner." He admitted, however, that agreement may not always be possible. The alternative, once the consensus approach fails, is decision-making by simple majority. The delegations were conscious that, in arranging for voting to take place, minorities had to be protected. For this, there are two important provisions. Minority safeguards If a proposal is perceived by a minimum of two members of the committee to have an adverse effect on his or her community, those two can then ensure that the minority safeguard is activated. This means that such a proposal would then have to be adopted by a vote of seven members of the committee. In other words, the five members of the LTTE alone could not assert their majority status and ensure that their proposals would be adopted. It would be necessary for them to do it in association with two other members — either from the Muslim party nominees or from the Government of Sri Lanka nominees. The second safeguard: If a district committee makes a project proposal to the regional committee and it is rejected, and the rejection is appealed against, that rejection has to be upheld again by a two-thirds majority. In effect, seven members of the ten must endorse the rejection. A third important element is that there will be observers from the donor community at the high-level committee and regional committee level. This was not a request from the donors but emerged from negotiations, when the parties agreed that there was a legitimate interest for donors to see how their money is being spent. They will have no role in the decision making but will ensure transparency in proceedings. One representative will be from the bilateral donors and one from the multilateral donors. The choice is left to the donors themselves. Suspension of cooperation The high-level committee will have three representatives — a nominee of the LTTE, one from the government and a nominee from the Muslim party. It will be a professional body responsible for evaluating project proposals and approving them. Again, the principle of decision-making will be consensus. But unlike at regional level, this committee cannot fall back on voting. If there is no agreement, there will be a 14-day cooling off period during which efforts are redoubled to strike accord. If there is no agreement even after 14 days, there will have to be a ‘suspension of cooperation’. "For suspension of cooperation to be necessary, it would mean that all the efforts at consensus building... have failed," Dhanapala underlined. "But even a suspension of cooperation does not affect the workings of the rest of the structure. "In other words, the regional committees and the district committees can continue functioning even though there is this temporary paralysis at the high-level committee," Functions Project formulation will be done at district committee level. When the projects are approved, monitoring of project implementation will also be done at district level. "It is the key, ground-level committee in charge of actual work," Dhanapala said. Implementation of projects may be undertaken by government agencies, by NGOs, etc. This decision must be made by the district committee. The regional committee receives proposals from the district committees and will ensure that there is some kind of prioritisation and evaluation preliminary where projects are concerned. They will recommend specific programmes to the high-level committee. Finally, the high level committee will decide on the broad policies of allocation and approve the project. Funds All foreign assistance goes straight to the treasury. Once a project is approved, the treasury will release the monies into a regional fund. This fund will have custodians (there is growing consensus between the government and LTTE that this would be the World Bank) who disburse the money to the implementing authorities in accordance with the normal criteria of project implementation. This will be done on an accountable basis and audited in according with international practice. "There is no way that a lump sum will be given to the LTTE, or to anybody else, for their use without any kind of basic requirements that normally operate with regard to disbursement of aid funds," Dhanapala endorsed. "Let me also emphasise that, as far as the limitations of the mechanism is concerned... it is an administrative arrangement consisting of three tiers of committees," he continued. "That is what it is. It is limited in its political mandate to undertake the reconstruction of tsunami damage in the north and the east where these six districts are concerned. "It is limited geographically to a belt two kilometres from the mean low water line which is defined in the Coast Conservation Act, which gets its definition from the Law of the Sea." There may be cases where flexibility is required — when a project involves travelling a little further inwards where there has been some discernible impact by the tsunami. Or where the implementation of a project proposal necessarily needs a slight departure from the two kilometres. Provisions for such flexibility have been built into the draft MoU. Repair of fishing jetties and harbours will be undertaken under the supervision of a multilateral agency which will act in consonance with Sri Lanka’s laws. The Coast Conservation Act would come into operation and the agency will be responsible for ensuring that both security and environmental standards are maintained. Ostriches, burying their heads in the sand "I think we have successfully drafted a memorandum of understanding that takes into account the fundamental objectives of providing humanitarian assistance financed by the generous foreign aid we are receiving from so many countries," Dhanapala declared. "We have engaged the LTTE because their cooperation is so essential, not just in the two districts that they control, but also in the other districts where they have a considerable influence," he elaborated. "We are not ostriches burying our heads in the sand. "The ministry of relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction already works directly with the LTTE in the north and the east. We are formalising this by bringing the LTTE into a process of governance. "We think it will also assist them in the transitional process they must undertake from being a rebel group, wedded to violence and committing the most horrendous terrorist acts, into being a political formation that can work with the government and other parties within a democratic framework. "This is an opportunity for us, therefore, to induct the LTTE into the administrative process of the country and, as importantly, to deliver assistance to the poor people of the north and east. They have suffered from the ravages of the conflict for two decades and have now been hit by the worst disaster ever to visit our land. "I think we should be mindful of the beneficial features of this mechanism. It is an opportunity to engender some trust and confidence in each other. It could be a basis for us to reopen the negotiations so that we could address the core issues that have caused the conflict."
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Jayantha
Dhanapala, head of Sri Lanka’s peace secretariat, last week lamented
that incorrect information about the proposed joint mechanism had
succeeded in making the yanthranaya appear to be a kumanthranaya.
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